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There  is  widespread  agreement  that  a  two-pronged  attack,  embracing  both  micro-  and 
macro-economic  reform,  is  necessary  to  turn  around  the  fortunes  of  the  Japanese 
economy. This paper focuses on the former set of initiatives adopted by the authorities in 
Japan, concentrating on those banking sector reforms implemented since around the year 
2000 when the reform programme appeared to enjoy renewed impetus. 
 
  The paper begins by reviewing the main problems still besetting the Japanese banking 
industry and responsible for its continued fragility, as exemplified by low profitability, 
both  in  absolute  terms  and  relative  to  G7  competitors,  weak  capitalisation,  poor  asset 
quality and excessive credit and market (stock and bond) risk exposure. The main reform 
initiatives are then identified. These embrace: the creation of a new financial architecture 
governing  the  regulation  and  supervision  of  banks,  with  the  newly-formed  Financial 
Services  Agency  featuring  as  its  operational  epi-centre;  the  reform  of  safety  net 
arrangements, and most especially those concerned with deposit insurance; the authorities' 
attempts to speed up the banks' resolution of their non-performing loan problems; the 
Bank of Japan's share-buying activities; the authorities' quest for the right to engage in 
"pre-emptive"  capital  injections;  and  recent  improvements  in  corporate  governance 
arrangements. The latter part of the paper represents a personal assessment of these reform 
initiatives,  from  an  efficiency/cost-effectiveness  standpoint,  and  includes 
recommendations for further change. 3 





Since the bursting of the asset price bubble in Japan in the late-1980s/early-1990s, both the 
Japanese economy and Japan's banking system have languished under the burdens created 
by a weak macro-economy, weak domestic property and stock markets, excess capacity, 
an  over-indebted  corporate  sector  and,  more  recently,  a  severe  bout  of  deflation.  In 
addition, policy "failures", on both the monetary and prudential front, have all too often 
served to exacerbate the problems and delay the recovery. This paper is concerned with an 
analysis of the "micro" (rather than "macro") reforms adopted in respect of the Japanese 
banking industry as part of the authorities' overall strategy for reinvigorating the Japanese 
economy, concentrating on the post-1999 period. [Studies of earlier reforms can be found 
in Hall, 1998a, 1998b, 1999a, 1999c and 2003a.] 
 
  Following  a  brief  review,  in  Section  2,  of  the  structure  of  the  Japanese  banking 
industry and recent developments therein, the nature of the continuing fragility facing the 
sector is identified in Section 3. This highlights the very low profitability achieved by 
Japanese banks, the extent of the weakness in their capital positions (especially if a more 
rigorous  interpretation  of  Basel  I  is  adopted),  the  worrying  scale  of  their  continuing 
exposures to credit and market (stock and bond) risk and the asset quality problems still 
facing  the  banks.  Section  4  then  explains  the  recent  reform  initiatives  adopted  by  the 
Japanese  authorities  to  address  some  of  the  problems  identified  earlier,  ranging  from 
wholesale reform of the governing regulatory/supervisory institutional landscape to more 
focussed measures relating to attempts to reduce banks' exposure to the stock market, 
speed up their resolution of NPLs and improve the cost-effectiveness of the supervisory 
regime more generally. The following section, Section 5, comprises a personal evaluation 4 
from  an  efficiency/cost-effectiveness  standpoint,  of  the  likely  impact  of  the  reform 
measures adopted, building on the earlier work carried out by the IMF in its 'Financial 
System Stability Assessment' of August 2003 (IMF, 2003). Proposals for further reform 
are duly presented in the final section, Section 7, following the provision of a summary of 
the paper's findings and conclusions reached in the penultimate section. 5 






2.1  Classification of Depository Institutions 
 
 
Apart from the public sector-owned postal network – "Japan Post" – the biggest deposit-
taking  organisation  in  the  world,  a  number  of  privately-owned  depository  institutions 
operate in Japan. These are separated into banks proper and cooperative type institutions – 
see  Table  2.1.  The  banking  group  comprises  'City  Banks',  'Regional  Banks',  'Second 
Association Regional Banks', foreign banks, 'Long-Term Credit Banks', 'Trust Banks' and 
'other' banks; whilst the cooperative grouping includes, inter alia, 'Shinkin Banks', 'Credit 




  Within the bank grouping, institutions are further sub-divided into 'Ordinary Banks' 
and 'Specialised Long-Term Financial Institutions', although recent financial liberalisation 
(see below) has served to erode somewhat the strict traditional business demarcations. All 
ordinary banks operate in accordance with the Banking Law of 1981 (as subsequently 
amended by the 1992 and 1998 revisions) and under license from the Financial Services 
Agency (FSA). Although their primary focus is on the provision of short-term financing 
facilities,  especially  in  the  form  of  deposits,  loans  and  funds  transfer,  they  are  also 
engaged today in medium- and long-term finance with both corporations (of all sizes) and 
individuals. Many are also substantial operators in international markets, although, since 
the bursting of the asset bubble in the late eighties, overseas operations have been scaled 
back by the majority. 
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  The first group of ordinary banks, the City Banks, are typically large-scale operators in 
both domestic and international markets, with nationwide branch networks at home and 
their  headquarters  sited  in  the  major  cities.  Traditionally,  they  have  been  the  major 
suppliers  of  short-term  finance  to  large  corporations  but,  with  the  development  of 
securities markets in Japan (Hall, 1998a, Chapter 3), have been forced to court SMEs and 
retail  customers  more  actively.  Liberalisation  (see  below)  has  also  allowed  them  to 
diversify more widely into securities and insurance business; and the growth in derivatives 
activities in Japan has provided further business opportunities in the last few years. 
 
  The Regional Banks constitute the second grouping of ordinary banks. They can be 
distinguished from the City Bank grouping by virtue of their smaller scale of activity and 
greater  geographical  concentration  of  business,  typically  focussing  their  operations  on 
SMEs and individuals residing in the prefecture within which they are headquartered. As a 
group, they are also major providers of funds to the call and bill money markets (Hall, 
ibid.). 
 
  The third group of ordinary banks, the Second Association Regional Banks, are also 
distinguished  by  the  strength  of  their  regional  ties  and  the  degree  of  geographical 
concentration of their business activities. The main difference with the regional banks lies 
in their reduced scale of activities and this is due, in part, to the fact that the majority are 
converted mutual banks which ceased to exist as a distinct class of bank in 1993. 
 
  The fourth and final grouping of banks classified as ordinary banks are the foreign 
banks. Traditionally focussed on foreign trade financing and foreign currency transactions, 
liberalisation  has  forced  them  to  look  elsewhere  for  their  salvation,  leading  them  to 7 
develop  off-balance-sheet  trading  activities  and  to  diversify  into  risk  management, 
advisory services and derivatives operations. 
 
  As for the 'Specialised Financial Institution' category of bank, the Long-Term Credit 
Banks  and  the  Trust  Banks  jointly  make  up  the  so-called  'Long-Term  Financial 
Institutions'.  These  are  distinct  from  the  other  specialist  depository  institutions,  the 
cooperatives,  which  are  all  non-profit-making  organisations.  The  Long-Term  Credit 
Banks, of which there are now only two following the Industrial Bank of Japan's decision 
to become part of Mizuho Holdings in September 2000 (see below), operate in accordance 
with the Long-Term Credit Bank Law of 1952. They were originally established to clearly 
differentiate the provision of short-term from long-term finance and to lighten the ordinary 
banks' burden in respect of the supply of long-term financing. Their funding activities are 
also distinguishable from those of ordinary banks by virtue of their greater ability to issue 
debentures  (liberalisation  has,  however,  reduced  this  comparative  advantage)  and  the 
restrictions imposed on their deposit-taking – they can only accept deposits from their 
borrowers and the purchasers of their debentures. The other group of specialist long-term 
financial  institution,  the  trust  banks,  comprises  institutions  which  are  allowed  to 
concurrently  engage  in  ordinary  banking  and  trust  banking.  The  initial  governing 
legislation was provided by the 'Law Concerning the Joint Operation of Ordinary Banks, 
Savings Bank Business and Trust Business' of 1943, but this was subsequently revised in 
1981 and, more recently, in 1992 under the 'Financial System Reform Law' (see below). 
The last piece of legislation has led to a dramatic growth in the number of trust banks 
operating in Japan (there were only 16 in existence in 1990) as newly-established entities 
now operate alongside those set up prior to 1960 and the nine locally-incorporated foreign 
bank subsidiaries approved in 1985. 8 
2.2    Recent Consolidation Amongst the Major Banks 
 
 
In a bid to cut costs and improve operating efficiency, a wave of consolidation has swept 
across the City Bank sector of the banking industry. This has resulted in their numbers 
falling from 13 in 1990 to just 7
2, with 5
3 major banking groups now dominating the 
banking scene in Japan – see Table 2.2. These groups typically include both a city bank 
and a trust bank and, in the case of Resona Holdings, regional banks also. 
 
  Nor  have  the  other  sub-sectors  escaped  the  chill  winds  of  changes.  For  example, 
although the number of regional banks in existence has remained constant since 1991 – 
notwithstanding the nationalisation of the Ashikaga Bank in December 2003
4 - the number 
of Second Association Regional Banks contracted sharply from 68 to 53 over the same 
period as a result of mergers. And, despite the deregulation - induced growth in trust bank 




2.3    Challenges Facing Japanese Banks 
 
 
Since the bursting of the asset price bubble in the late-1980s, the Japanese banks have 
faced a number of serious problems. These comprise, inter alia (Hall, 1999a; IMF, 2003): 
weakness  in    the  domestic  economy,
6  reversal  of  which  is  hampered  by  the  limited 
remaining scope for manoeuvre available to the government given that nominal interest 
rates have been held at around zero per cent for a number of years now and the public 
finances are at crisis point (Hall, 2003b); continuing weakness in the domestic property 
market  (both  commercial  and  residential);  weakness  in  the  Japanese  stock  market;
7 
continuing excess capacity in the banking sector (despite some exit); low profitability; and 9 
persistent deflation,
8 which exacerbates the corporate sector's ability to service its debts 
and raises the government's real debt burden. And to this list must be added the internal 
management  failings  which  have  allowed  the  industry  to  be  brought  to  its  knees,  the 
flawed corporate governance arrangements which have contributed to the banks' malaise, 
and  the  inadequate  external  oversight  exercised  by  the  supervisory  authorities  (Hall, 
2003a). 
 
  Notwithstanding these long-standing problems, however, there are tentative signs that 
the banks' fortunes may be improving, in part due to the opportunities presented by the 
programme of "liberalisation and deregulation" instituted since the 1980s (Hall, 1998a, 
Chapter 4).
9 This was evident from the release of the banks' interim results for the period 
to  end-September  2003  which  showed  that  the  big  four
10  banking  groups  had  each 
returned to the black, reporting positive net profits for the first time in three years. The 
turnaround, which saw the major banks' combined net income rise to Y 921 billion from a 
net loss of  Y 16 billion a year earlier, was mainly due to the stock market rally noted 
earlier and the economic recovery, which led to a drop in non-performing loans (NPLs)
11 
(though, in part, this was due to debt forgiveness) and lower "credit costs". Despite the 
evident improvement, however, which led each of the 'big 4' to forecast full year profits 
for fiscal 2003,
12,13 things remain bleak: core profitability remains weak; no significant 
expansion in lending margins was achieved; the demand for loans remains sluggish (bank 
lending  has  fallen  for  seven  consecutive  years);  gross  fee  and  commission  income
14 
remains at around 17 per cent of operating income, compared with figures of around 30 
per cent for US banks; NPLs still average around 6.5 per cent of total loans for the big 
banks; no generalised recovery in land prices is in sight; the corporate sector remains in a 
precarious financial position; when deferred tax assets are stripped out, most, if not all, 10 
banks are exposed to be seriously under-capitalised; and most banks are still believed to be 
under-provisioned and overstating the value of the collateral backing their loans, thereby 
inflating stated profitability. It will therefore be some time yet before the Japanese banking 
industry becomes rehabilitated, ready to face once again the competition in today's global 
banking industry. 11 





Despite substantial narrowing of the "Japan premium" since the crisis of Autumn 1997, 
when a number of important financial institutions collapsed and investor panic set in (see 
Hall, 1998a), the Japanese banking sector today is still inherently fragile. This is evident 
from  the  relatively-poor  "financial  strength"  ratings  accorded  the  Japanese  banks  by 
external  credit  rating  agencies  (see  Table  3.1)  and  is  due  to  low  profitability,  a  weak 
capital base, poor asset quality, excessive exposure to the stock market and significant 




3.1  Profitability 
 
 
With respect to the profitability of Japanese banks, recent trends are exhibited in Tables 
3.2  (which  traces  the  trend  in  net  profits  (measured  in  Y trillion),  and  its  constituent 
components, from 1990 to 2003) and Table 3.3 (which looks at movements in the major 
indicators of profitability over the more recent period of 1998 to 2003, expressing the date 
in percentage terms). [For a more detailed study see Oyama and Shiratori, 2001.] The 
evidence is clear: profitability is very low, both in absolute terms (indeed, substantial net 
losses were recorded in fiscal 2001 and 2002 and in earlier years – see Table 3.2) and 
relative  to  other  G7  countries  (only  the  absolute  pre-tax  RoE  and  RoA  figures  are, 
however, given in Table 3.3; for a comparison with other G7 countries see IMF, 2003, 
p.14); interest income, currently around 60 per cent of gross income, remains the main 
source of income, although fee and trading income has more than doubled (to nearly 17 12 
per cent of total income) since 1998; profitability is heavily influenced by movements in 
the local stock market (see the correlation between net profit and realised capital gains on 
Table 3.2); spreads remain low (for a comparison with the US and Germany see Bank of 
Japan,  2003)  and  have  hardly  changed  in  recent  years  (see  Table  3.3)  in  spite  of 
deregulation, the pressure to raise spreads in order to cover rising loan losses and a move 
into higher margin credit card business; and the growth in NPLs since 1994, through its 
impact on loan losses, has caused operating profit to be negative since 1993 (see Table 
3.2).  This  low  level  of  profitability  is,  in  turn,  due  to  the  weakness  of  the  domestic 
economy and the corporate sector, the collapse in asset values since the bursting of the 
bubble  in  1989/90,  the continuing  excess  capacity  in  the  financial  services  sector,  the 
competition faced from "subsidised" public sector institutions and weaknesses in corporate 
governance, which result in an eschewal of the profit-maximising goal. And, in respect of 
those banks which received capital injections during 1998/99 (see Tables A3 and A4 in the 
Appendix), adherence to the SME lending targets they were obliged to adopt is unlikely to 
have done much to further their cause. Although all the major banking groups (other than 
Resona) announced positive net profits at the interim reporting stage for end-September 
2003 – combined net income came in at  Y 921 billion – and are forecasting significant 
profits for fiscal 2003 as a whole (see endnote 13 for the realised figures), it will be some 
time  before  they  catch  up  with  their  G10  counterparts.  Nevertheless,  looking  on  the 
positive side, the interim results, which were heavily influenced by the recovery in the 
local stock market, did demonstrate the banks' success in reducing their NPL ratios, their 
exposure to the stock market
15 and their reliance on deferred tax assets as a source of 
capital (see below) - trends confirmed with the publication of the full year's results for 
fiscal  2003.  Moreover,  there  was  some  evidence  of  an  expansion  of  fee  income  as  a 
proportion of total income. 13 
3.2  Capital Adequacy 
 
 
As demonstrated in Table 3.4, which provides data for the overall and Tier 1 adjusted 
ratios posted by Japanese banks during the period 1998-2003, all groups of banks have 
consistently met the minimum standards laid down by bank regulators, namely a minimum 
risk asset ratio of 8 per cent (and a minimum Tier 1 ratio of 4 per cent) for internationally-
active banks and  a 4 per cent (almost Tier 1)  ratio for domestic-only  operators. This, 
however, masks a number of serious problems, as revealed in Table 3.5. Firstly, deferred 
tax assets (DTAs), which are credits arising from accumulated loan losses, against taxes 
levied on taxable income over the next five years, are exceedingly high, accounting for 
Y 10.6 trillion (or 43 per cent) of reported aggregate core capital at end-March 2003. [For 
the major banks, DTAs as a proportion of Tier 1 capital, increased from 42 per cent to 55 
per cent during fiscal 2002, mainly due to a large decline in Tier 1 capital.] Given this 
form  of  capital  is  not  available  in  a  liquidation  and  hence  does  not  satisfy  the  main 
characteristic  of  prime  quality  capital,  namely  the  availability  to  absorb  losses  in  all 
prospective circumstances, it should, arguably, be deducted from regulatory capital, or at 
least limited further (i.e. beyond the current 40 per cent of estimated taxable income over 
the next five years), as in the US – see below. 
 
  Secondly, the historical dependence of the banks' net capital on movements in the local 
stock market – under BIS rules, 45 per cent of the latest gains on securities holdings are 
eligible for inclusion in Tier 2 capital – is depicted in Table 3.5, showing the damage 
wrought by the collapse in stock prices in Japan since 1989/90. 
 14 
  Thirdly,  the  steady  decline  in  core  capital  is  also  evident,  the  result  of  poor 
profitability (which reduces retained earnings) and the inability to issue common stock (at 
a reasonable price) because of the declining value of a bank franchise. 
 
  Fourthly, it is also clear from Table 3.5 that a significant amount (i.e. Y 7.3 trillion or 
29 per cent of the total) of core capital is still owned by the government, the product of the 
DIC capital injections of 1998/9; this has yet to be repaid. 
 
  Fifthly, as noted by the IMF (IMF, 2003), the provisions held against loans needing 
"attention"  and  "special  attention"  (i.e.  "Category  II"  loans)  are,  in  reality,  specific 
provisions as they are held against the impairment of identified assets. Accordingly, they 
should not be treated as general provisions and should, instead, be fully deducted from 
capital. 
 
  Sixthly,  a  strict  interpretation  of  the  BIS  rules  would  require  full  deduction  of 
commercial institutions' cross-shareholdings; as banks routinely issue preferred securities 
and  subordinated  debt  to  affiliates  and  other  financial  institutions  (especially  life 
companies)
16 a portion at least of such reciprocal cross-shareholdings, should be deducted 
from capital to avoid the illusion of financial strength generated by such "double gearing". 
 
  Finally, to the extent that banks still hide losses, mis-classify their NPLs,
17 and hence 
under-provision,
18 and exacerbate the value of their loan collateral,
19 both profitability and 
capital adequacy are likely to be further over-stated. Taking these and other factors
20 into 
account would cause most banks to breach the minimum capital requirements. 
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3.3   Asset Quality and the Banks' NPL Problems 
 
 
Despite many years of grappling with their bad debt problems – between fiscal 1992 and 
fiscal 2001, for  example, the banking industry  incurred  Y 82 trillion of "losses" on its 
disposal of bad debts, including making direct write-offs of Y 35 trillion and transfers to 
allowances for loan losses of  Y 41 trillion – the Japanese banking industry still faces a 
huge burden to overcome. The latest official figures available reveal that,  for the banking 
sector as a whole, "bad" loans, when defined as "risk management loans" [which comprise 
"non-performing loans" (i.e. loans to borrowers in legal bankruptcy plus past due loans in 
arrears by three months or more) plus "restructured loans" (see Hall, 2000, p.80, for a full 
definition],  amounted  to  Y 31.2  trillion  at  end-September  2003  –  see  Table  3.6.  This 
represented 7.2 per cent of the banking sector's total loans. These figures compare with 
figures of  Y 31.6 trillion and 6.8 per cent for the industry's "classified assets" – that is, 
loans classified as "bankrupt or de facto bankrupt", "doubtful" and "special attention" – 
posted for end-September 2003 under the "self assessment of asset quality" required by the 
Financial Reconstruction Law (see Table 3.7). For the deposit-taking sector as a whole 
(i.e. including credit co-operations), the figure for bad loans (using the first definition) was 
Y 45.7 trillion at end-March 2003 (see Table 3.8), the latest date for which figures are 
available. 
 
  As demonstrated in Tables 3.8 to 3.10, however, a new downwards trend in reported 
bad loans, under both definitions, appears to have started in March 2002, with the major 
banks' NPL ratio being down to 6.39 per cent by end-September 2003 (see Table 3.7). 
This suggests the major banks are on track to meet the authorities' "target" of halving their 
NPL ratios between end-March 2002 and end-March 2005 (see below), although, to the 16 
extent  that  it  has  been  achieved  through  debt  forgiveness,  the  drive  to  revitalise  the 
economy through removal of "zombie" companies will have been slowed. 
 
 
3.4   Risk Exposures 
 
 
Given the relatively-weak capital positions of most banks, it is of major concern that their 
risk exposures remain so high. In particular, market risks, arising from exposure to stock 
and  government  bond  markets,  and  credit  risks  are  significant.  In  connection  with 
exposure to the stock market, banks, under pressure from the authorities (see below), have 
markedly reduced their exposures – major banks, for example, cut their holdings by Y 9.7 
trillion during fiscal 2002, to Y 14.8 trillion, roughly equivalent to their combined Tier 1 
capital – but, given the volatility of stock prices, further reductions are necessary to ensure 
a more efficient use of capital (Bank of Japan, 2003). And, as shown in the previous 
section, credit risks are still very high, and the deterioration in asset quality may not yet be 
fully reflected in banks' financial statements, despite the best endeavours of the FSA. 
 
  In the light of the above, the IMF (IMF, 2003) decided to carry out a number of stress 
tests to see how vulnerable Japanese banks are to a variety of eminently possible "shocks". 
Following the Japanese authorities' refusal to share supervisory data, the IMF used the 
published  accounts  of  a  sample  of  banks  relating  to  their  end-March  2002  and  2003 
reports.  For  the  first  set of  tests,  the  sample  covered  7  city,  21  regional  and  2  credit 
cooperative central banks, which represented 56 per cent of total banking sector assets. 
Three stress scenarios were examined: a market risk stress shock based on a 20 per cent 
decline in equity prices; another market risk stress shock based on a 100 basis points (i.e. a 
one percentage point) increase in yields; and a credit risk stress shock based on a 3 per 17 
cent loss on the book value of the banks' loan portfolios. In each case, the banks' loss-
bearing  capacities  are  measured  according  to  their  ability  to  absorb  losses  against 
shareholder equity value, measured both gross and net of DTAs. 
 
  The group average stress test results are presented in Table 3.11. They demonstrate 
that each single market stress event consumes a significant portion of risk-bearing capacity 
for each group. The equity stress event, for example, would erode city banks' shareholders' 
equity by 37 per cent if DTAs are included and by 102 per cent if they are excluded. For 
the  regional  banks  the  figures  are  somewhat  better,  coming  in  at  11  and  15  per  cent 
respectively. The cooperative central banks prove least affected, recording figures of 3 per 
cent and 3 per cent respectively. Contrariwise, the cooperative central banks are shown to 
be most exposed to interest rate risk (recording figures of 49 per cent and 51 per cent 
respectively), compared with figures for the city banks of 17 per cent (43 per cent) and 16 
per cent (22 per cent) respectively.  If the market risk stress events  are combined, the 
regional banks fare best (see IMF, Box 4, p.20). 
 
  As  far  as  credit  risk  is concerned,  the  city  banks  are  again  shown  to be  the  most 
exposed, with a 3 per cent credit loss destroying 54 per cent (140 per cent if DTAs are 
excluded) of shareholders' equity. The other groups, however, are not much better off, the 
regionals recording figures of 41 per cent and 63 per cent, and the cooperative central 
banks 38 per cent and 39 per cent. 
 
  Using the same sample and methodology (see IMF, 2003, Appendix III, pp.83-4) for 
the banks' end-March 2003 results, the risk-bearing capacities of both the city bank and 
cooperative central bank groupings are shown to have been further eroded – see Table 18 
3.12. In the case of the former grouping, the reduction in potential losses arising from 
lower equity prices was more than offset by a decline in shareholders' equity, thereby 
increasing equity risk [44 per cent of shareholders' equity, excluding DTAs, would be 
destroyed]. And a rebalancing of their portfolios away from equities and in favour of 
government bonds increased interest rate risk (a 33 per cent reduction in shareholders' 
equity would result, 98 per cent if DTAs are excluded). For the cooperative central bank 
grouping, although exposure to equity risk remained static, a big jump ( to 72 per cent and 
76 per cent respectively) in exposure to interest rate risk was evident. Finally, for the 
regional  bank  grouping,  the  results  were  mixed.  Whilst  equity  risk  exposure  declined 
slightly, interest rate risk and credit risks increased. 
 
  These results duly led the IMF to conclude that the Japanese banking system is under-
capitalised relative to the interest rate, equity price and credit risks in the system, and all 
the  more  so  if  DTAs  are  excluded  from  shareholders'  equity,  as  they    recommend. 
Accordingly, they argued for an urgent recapitalisation of the banking sector, using public 
funds where necessary – see below. While the recovery in share prices since March 2003 
will  act  to  boost  bank  profits  and  capital,  and  hence  reduce  equity  risk,  the  fall  in 
government  bond  prices  will  serve  to  pull  in  the  other  direction.  Moreover,  the 
acceleration in the disposal of the banks' NPLs will, in the short term, further damage 
profitability by raising credit costs, although asset quality should have improved. 19 





4.1   Reform of the Regulatory and Supervisory Framework 
 
 
As explained in Hall (2003a), the institutional framework governing the regulation and 
supervision of financial institutions in Japan has evolved since 1998 from one dominated 
by the Ministry of Finance (MoF) to the current one dominated by the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA). The other main agencies involved, in respect of banking regulation and 
supervision, are the DIC and the BoJ – see Tables 4.1 and 4.2 for a summary of their main 
roles and an outline of how they interact respectively. 
 
 
4.2  Reform of the Safety Net Arrangements 
 
 
The current safety net arrangements operating in Japan embrace the traditional lender of 
last resort role exercised by the central bank (as outlined in Articles 1 and 2 of the Bank of 
Japan Law of 1997), deposit insurance arrangements, which cater for both 'normal' and 
'financial crisis' situations, and prudential regulation and supervision, as predominantly 
exercised by the FSA (although the BoJ retains the right to inspect institutions who hold 
current accounts with it). Recent reforms in the last two areas – little has changed in 
respect of the lender of last resort function – will now be examined. 
 
4.2.1  Deposit Insurance Reform 
As noted in Appendix 1, which provides a more detailed review of the deposit insurance 
arrangements  currently  operating  in  Japan,  recent  reforms  (i.e.  post-2000  –  for  a 
discussion  of  reforms  prior  to  this  see  Hall,  1999c  and  2003a)  have  centred  on  the 20 
following:  amendment  to  the  schedule  for  removal  of  the  blanket  guarantee  given  to 
depositors;  introduction, in  2003,  of  the  "Special  Measures  Law  for  the  Promotion  of 
Organizational  Restructuring";  the  introduction  of  on-site  inspections  by  the  Deposit 
Insurance Corporation of Japan (DICJ); and the establishment, in April 2003, of a new 
body – the Industrial Revitalization Corporation of Japan (IRCJ) – to help revitalise the 
business of ailing corporations and further assist the banks in their disposal of NPLs.
21 As 
for the DICJ's continuing operations, it was the bailout of Resona Bank in May 2003 and 
the nationalisation of Ashikaga Bank in November 2003 which attracted the limelight – 
see below. 
 
4.2.2  Prudential Regulation and Supervision of Banks 
A  number  of  developments  in  the  FSA's  inspection  and  supervision  regime  occurred 
during the period July 2002 and June 2004 (for a consideration of the BoJ's activities in 
this area see BoJ, 2003b). For the FSA's "Program Year" for 2003, which ran from 1 July 
2002 until 30 June 2003, the emphasis was on an intensification in inspection of the major 
banking groups. This involved: (i) re-organising inspection units so that a single unit was 
responsible for year-round supervision of each major banking group; (ii) forcing banks to 
make more realistic valuations of their assets (consistent with the "Program for Financial 
Revival" – see below – this was done through routine and special inspections and the 
disclosure of the gap between major banks' self-assessments and the FSA's assessment, on 
an  aggregated  basis);  (iii)  intensive  examination,  by  a  special  team  established  in 
December 2002, of the appropriateness and progress of the reconstruction plans adopted 
by the major banks' debtors; (iv) introduction and monitoring of the banks' use of the 
"Discounted Cash Flow" (DCF) method for determining provisions; (v) harmonisation of 
the  borrower  classification  of  large  debtors  with  loans  from  more  than  two  banks; 21 
(vi) inspections (during April and June 2003) checking for compliance with guidelines 
relating to increases in capital; (vii) ensuring that the banks classify their credits to SMEs 
correctly; (viii) establishing special teams (in July 2002) to carry out inspections relating 
to market risk and systems (i.e. computer) risk; and (ix) introducing an inspection manual 
for Financial Holding Companies (July 2003). 
 
  The FSA's inspection priorities for the Program Year 2003 (i.e. lasting from 1 July 
2003 to 30 June 2004) largely represented  a continuation of initiatives adopted in the 
previous  Program  Year.  Accordingly,  the  measures  adopted  under  the  Program  for 
Financial Revival aimed at improving the accuracy of the major banks' classification of 
assets, and hence provisioning, were carried forward, with a closer look now also being 
taken at the value of banks' DTAs and their internal audit functions and risk management 
systems. Additionally, however, the FSA undertook measures to ensure that banks treat 
their corporate borrowers properly and, more generally, adequately protect the interests of 
the consumers of their products and enhance the convenience of users. Finally, the FSA 
began  inspections,  for  the  first  time,  of  government  financial  agencies  and  the  postal 
agency. 
 
  In  all,  inspections  of  830  financial  institutions  are  planned  for  this  Program  Year, 
compared with 832 carried out last year, excluding inspection of the postal agency and 
four other public sector financial agencies. And, in terms of the banks, full-scope, risk-
based on-site inspection of major banks will take place every year, with regionals being 
similarly inspected every two years. 
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Under the 'Emergency Economic Package' of April 2001 the government announced plans 
to force banks to write off their existing bad debts by end-2003 and any new bank debts 
which  surfaced  within  three  years  of  their  emergence  (FSA,  2001).  Although  this 
commitment eventually related only to the resolution of the major banks' non-performing 
loans  (NPLs)  which  had  been  classified  as  "in  danger  of  bankruptcy"  or  worse,  most 
commentators  assumed  that  it  extended  to  all  banks  and  to  all  of  their  NPLs.  The 
Government's resolve to deal with the NPL problem was reaffirmed in April 2002 when it 
tightened the initial requirement that any post-March 2001 bad loans be written off within 
three years of their emergence by requiring that banks dispose of half of any new bad 
loans  within  one  year  of  their  classification  and  80  per  cent  within  two  years  (FSA, 
2002c).  Subsequent  to  this,  the  Prime  Minister  reconfirmed  his  desire  to  "completely 
resolve the non-performing loan problem by 2004" on 30 September 2002 (FSA, 2002b), 
although the FSA has since said – see below – it is trying to halve the NPL ratios of the 
major banks by end-March 2005. 
 
  An early move (June 2001) taken by the government to assist in the prompt disposal of 
banks'  NPLs  was  to  extend  the  deadline  for  RCC  purchases  of  NPLs  from  sound 
institutions  to the end of March 2005 under an amendment to the Financial Revitalization 
Law. At the same time, it was agreed that the RCC's  remit would be further extended in 
coming months. Accordingly, in August 2001, the RCC was authorised to conduct trust 
business, enabling it to subscribe non-performing loans via the trust method, after setting 
up a Trust Business Department. Then, in November 2001, it set up a Corporate Revival 
Department  to  engage  in  corporate  restructuring  of  those  debtors  for  whom  such 23 
reorganisation was possible. [The services of the Development Bank of Japan and the 
Japan Bank for International Cooperation were later used and, by end-March 2004, 417 
debtors had been assisted by the RCC in this way.] And then, in March 2002, it set up an 
Asset Purchase Promotion Department to enhance and strengthen the organisation and 
functions involved in the purchase of NPLs from sound institutions and others. 
 
  To accelerate the banks' rate of disposal of its NPLs the FSA announced, in September 
2001, a new "three pillared" scheme to tackle the banks' bad debts.
22 This would involve: 
more rigorous and continuous (previously biennial) inspection of major banks' books by 
the FSA; requiring the banks to set aside higher provisions against bad debts to large 
corporate borrowers; and encouraging the banks to sell their doubtful loans to the RCC. A 
bill allowing the RCC to buy a broader
23 range of bad debts at "market prices" from the 
banks was subsequently approved in October 2001. The assets, however, must be disposed 
of within three years of the date of purchase. 
 
  With respect to the new inspection regime, "special inspections" of the major banks' 
loans to large troubled
24 corporates began in October 2001
25 and lasted through until April 
2002. The outcome of the inspections (see FSA, 2002c) was that, of the 149 problem 
borrowers reviewed, 71 were downrated, with 34 of these being classified as "in danger of 
bankruptcy". This meant that, of the total amount of credits involved of  Y 12.9 trillion, 
Y 7.5 trillion had to be downrated, Y 3.7 trillion of which moved to the lowest loan status, 
necessitating provisions of around 70 per cent of their value. 
 
  A second round of special inspections, again relating to the (11) major banks' loans to 
large troubled corporates, ended in March 2003. It covered the fiscal year ending March 24 
2003 and, using discounted cash flow techniques
26 for the first time in the assessment of 
the adequacy of provisions, found that, of the 167 problem borrowers reviewed (including 
25 new names but excluding 46 of those covered in previous special inspections) and 
covering  Y 14.4  trillion  of  credit,  27  (including  eight  of  the  new  names)  required 
downgrading  with  respect  of  the  classifications  made  in  the  interim  reports  of  end-
September 2002, involving Y 2.4 trillion (Y 0.3 trillion) of credit (FSA, 2003). Y 1.0 trillion 
was reclassified as "in danger of bankruptcy" or worse. The findings meant that, for those 
banks affected, an additional  Y 1.3 trillion of losses were incurred on their disposal of 
NPLs, embracing Y 0.8 trillion of write-offs and Y 0.5 trillion of additional provisions. 
 
  The third and final round of such special inspections began on 27 January 2004 and 
was completed on 23 April 2004. It covered the period ending at end-March 2004. As 
before,  the  inspections  covered  the  11  major  banks  and  were  designed  to  check  the 
classifications used by the main banks in respect of large troubled corporate borrowers. 
The latest business conditions of the debtors were assessed using the DCF method, taking 
into account their reconstruction plans. The inspections duly found (FSA, 2004b) that, of 
the  133
27  problem  borrowers  reviewed,  responsible  for  Y 10.5  trillion  of  credit,  26 
(including  four  of  the  new  names)  required  downgrading,  compared  with  the 
classifications made at end-September 2003, 22 of which were reclassified as "in danger 
of bankruptcy" or worse. These downgradings covered total amounts of credit of  Y 2.2 
trillion and Y 1.8 respectively. Taking account of the upgradings given (to 23 borrowers), 
the results meant that additional losses arising from the disposal of NPLs amounting to 
Y 0.44 trillion were borne by those banks affected, comprising additional write-offs of 
Y 0.4 trillion and additional provisions for loan losses of Y 0.04 trillion. 
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  The results suggested that, at least for the major banks (excluding Resona) and in 
respect  of  their  loans  to large  troubled  corporates,  the  banks'  loan  classifications  (and 
hence  provisions)  were  becoming  more  realistic  and  converging  with  the  FSA's  own 
estimates, although subsequent events at UFJ (see below) suggest this conclusion may be 
premature. 
 
  Added impetus to the speedy resolution of the banks' NPL problem was provided in 
October 2002 with the government's announcement of a "Program for Financial Revival". 
This  represented  the  outcome  of  deliberations  by  a  taskforce  set  up  earlier  by  the 
Economics  Minister  to  consider  how  best  to  resolve  the  banks'  continuing  bad  debt 
problems.  Following  fierce  opposition  from  politicians,  bureaucrats  and  bankers  alike, 
however,  the  delayed  report  was  short  on  specifics  and  clearly  not  as  radical  as  Mr 
Takenaka had originally intended. Forced to apologise earlier to the Diet for misleading 
statements concerning his personal belief that no company or financial concern should be 
"too-big-to-fail",  the  watering-down  of  his  draft  proposals  was  a  further  sign  that  the 
reforming zeal of the Koizumi administration was on the wane. 
 
  The package of proposals that duly emerged, in an attempt to revitalise the Japanese 
economy, comprised, inter alia, the following:
28 
(i)    the government would work together with the BoJ
29 to try to halve the bad loan 
ratios of the big banks by end-March 2005 (compared with end-March 2002); 
(ii)   the government would consider the possibility of establishing a new system for the 
prompt infusion of state capital into under-capitalised banks (the so-called "pre-
emptive" capital injections – see below); 26 
(iii)  the government would act to ensure a tightening of the assessment of bank asset 
quality, possibly involving the use of DCF techniques
30 in the assessment of the 
adequacy of provisions;
31 
(iv)   the government would adopt stricter criteria concerning the banks' use of deferred 
tax  assets  within  regulatory  capital,  although  no  limits  or  timetables
32  for 
implementation  of  a  stricter  approach  were  mentioned  (Mr  Takenaka  had 
originally  suggested  that  a  10  per  cent  limit  should  be  imposed  at  end-March 
2003);
33 
(v)   as  a  means  of  enhancing  bank  performance,  the  government  would  consider 
converting the bank preference shares that it already owns, because of previous 
bailouts  (see  Appendix  1),  into  common  stock,  thereby  triggering  (partial) 
nationalisation for institutions whose operations had "seriously deteriorated"; and 
(vi)   the government would establish a new body, to operate alongside the RCC, to 
rehabilitate troubled companies whose future prospects appeared bright. [As noted 
above, the new body became known as the Industrial Revitalization Cooporation of 
Japan (IRCJ) and began operations in May 2004.] 
 
  Although the effect of the publication of the "Takenaka Plan", as it became known, 
was to reduce the immediate threats of widescale bank nationalisation (and associated 
management  changes)  and  an  escalation  in  the  extent  of  corporate  restructuring  and 
bankruptcy, the firming-up of the timescale for reform unveiled on 30 December 2002 
served to keep up the pressure on recalcitrant bankers. A four-month deadline (i.e. until 
the end of fiscal 2002) was duly delivered to the banks for convincing the FSA that they 
were  serious  about  promptly  remedying  their  financial  weaknesses;  otherwise, 
nationalisation beckoned. It was also confirmed that: a decision on the possible use of 27 
discounted cash flow analysis in the assessment of borrowers' strength would be taken by 
the end of fiscal 2002; talks would begin in December 2002 on whether or not the rules 
governing the inclusion of DTAs within regulatory capital should be changed, and, if so, 
how;  the  FSA  would  decide  within  six  months  whether  new  rules  are  necessary  to 
facilitate the injection of public funds into ailing banks under "non crisis" conditions; the 
FSA  will  embark  on  a  further  round  of  "special  inspections"  of  banks'  loan  books  in 
February  2003  (see  above);  outside  auditors  will  be  used  to  calculate  banks'  capital 
adequacy  ratios;  guidelines  will  be  drawn  up  concerning  the  possible  conversion  of 
government-owned preference shares into ordinary shares;
34 the FSA is to reduce the time 
banks are allowed to improve their financial strength under "Prompt Corrective Action" 
procedures from three years to one year; and that a taskforce, headed by Mr Takenaka 
himself, will be set up within the FSA to monitor the banks' disposal of their NPLs. 
 
  In the light of the relentless official pressure to accelerate disposal of their NPLs and, 
as an alternative to using the RCC
35 and the ICRJ, many of the banks have moved to set up 
their own distressed debt work-out facilities to try and secure better prices for the sale of 
their debts. Mizuho, for example, joined forces with four major international investment 
banks – UBS, Morgan Stanley, Deutsche Bank and Merrill Lynch – plus a high-profile US 
private equity investment company, Cerberus, to help resolve up to Y 4.6 trillion of NPLs 
through the establishment of new companies into which NPLs will be injected. Similarly, 
SMFG has teamed up with Goldman Sachs to set up a fund which will eventually receive 
up to  Y 1 billion of bad loans from SMFG. Resona has also agreed with Nomura, the 
country's  largest  stockbroker,  the  Development  Bank  of  Japan  and  a  number  of 
international investment banks, to set up a corporate revival fund to accelerate efforts to 
clean up its bad loans. And finally, UFJ Bank announced, in May 2004, that it is to team 28 
up with Merrill Lynch to create a fund of up to Y 100 billion to purchase its loans to SMEs. 
UFJ will use the "Genesis Fund", in which it will hold a 30 per cent stake, together with 
another UFJ–Merrill Lynch joint firm founded earlier for business turnaround services (i.e. 
UFJ Strategic Partner Co.) to accelerate the disposal of its NPLs. UFJ hopes, through this 
and other routes, to cut NPLs to Y 2.3 trillion by end-March 2005. 
 
 
4.4   Other Reform Initiatives 
 
 
The BoJ's share-buying activities. In the light of the government's decision
36 of June 
2001 to force banks and bank holding companies to limit the value of their holdings of 
equity to 100 per cent of Tier 1 capital by September 2004 (extended in July 2003 to 
September 2006), the BoJ announced in September 2002 that it would, for the first time, 
purchase shares outright from the banks. The economic rationale behind the move was to 
help stem the fall in share prices, and hence limit the appraisal losses banks would be 
forced to book at the end of the fiscal year, caused in part by the earlier plan to force the 
banks to divest a portion of their equity holdings.
37 The BoJ also made it clear that there 
was a wider political motive behind its actions namely, to try and shame the authorities 
into  adopting  a  more  aggressive  approach  towards  the  handling  of  the  banks'  NPL 
problem, a move which apparently worked, as noted above.  
 
  The BoJ's programme of share purchases subsequently began on 29 November 2002 
and,  by  the  12  December  2002,  the  BoJ  let  it  be  known  that  Y 71.2  billion  of  such 
purchases had been made. By 20 February 2003, this figure had risen to Y 700 billion and, 
by end-March 2003, to Y 1.2 trillion (BoJ, 2003, p.33). It is envisaged that purchases of up 
to Y 3 trillion (Y 2 trillion has been spent to date) in aggregate – with a maximum of Y 750 29 
billion from individual banks – will be made under this facility and that the shares will be 
held by the BoJ until at least September 2007 (Bank of England, 2002, p.39). 
 
  By end-March 2003 four of the five major internationally-active banks had achieved 
the target limit of 100 per cent of Tier 1 capital with the other, Mizuho, lagging behind by 
only 7 per cent. 
 
Pre-emptive capital injections. As foreshadowed in the "Program for Financial Revival", 
a bill concerning the use of pre-emptive capital injections was eventually put before the 
Diet.  It  was  duly  approved  by  the  lower  house  and  approval  from  the  upper  house 
materialised on 15 June 2004. The purpose of the new framework for injecting public 
funds,  which took effect on 1 August 2004 and will involve the establishment of a new 
account for strengthening financial functions at the DIC with a government guarantee of 
Y 2 trillion, is to revitalise the regional economy and maintain the orderly supply of credit 
by strengthening the financial functions of weak but solvent banks. As an alternative to the 
activities of the "financial crisis management" procedures, it allows for the public injection 
of  capital  (through  the  purchase  of  preferred  stocks  from  banks,  or  preferred  equity 
securities/subordinated loans from co-operatives) whilst avoiding the stigma and market 
uncertainty  associated  with  the  former.  Applicants  will  have  to  demonstrate,  to  the 
satisfaction  of  a  "Council  for  Strengthening  Financial  Functions"  comprising  external 
experts,  that  management  reforms  will  allow  them  to  both  meet  numerical  targets  for 
profitability and boost efficiency, and assist in the revitalisation of the regional economy. 30 
Other.  As  noted  by  the  IMF  (IMF,  2003),  a  number  of  significant  improvements  in 
corporate governance arrangements have occurred in recent years in Japan. These embrace 
a  raising  of  Japanese  standards  for  accounting  to  near  international  best  practices,  a 
strengthening of the accounting and auditing framework [assisted by the establishment of 
the Certified Public Accountants and Auditing Oversight Board (CPAAOB) in 1 April 
2004], the revision to the Commercial Code in April 2003 giving corporations the option 
of a governance structure with a majority of outside directors on the Board, and reform of 
the corporate insolvency laws to both speed up
38 and enhance the cost-effectiveness of 
insolvency procedures. Moreover, in March 2004, the Tokyo Stock Exchange announced 
new corporate  governance  guidelines – covering the protection of shareholders' rights, 
shareholder  equality,  relations  with  employees  and  other  stakeholders,  information 
disclosure and transparency, and the roles of boards of directors and auditing boards – 
which it urges listed companies to observe. The guidelines were designed to be consistent 
with the OECD's "Principles of Corporate Governance".  31 





Having identified and explained the key banking sector reforms implemented over the last 
few  years in Japan in the previous section, an  assessment of each key reform is now 
provided. Recommendations for change/improvement are outlined in the next section. 
 
 
5.1   Reform of the Regulatory and Supervisory Framework 
 
 
As explained in Section 4.1 (and in more detail in Hall 2003a), the creation of a unified 
supervisory body in the guise of the FSA is a very recent phenomenon. Accordingly, a 
definitive judgement on the success or failure of the new "architecture" may be somewhat 
premature. Nevertheless, it has been in existence long enough for some initial assessment 
to be made. 
 
  To date, the overall picture is very encouraging, a view shared by the IMF, which 
alludes to the "immense strides" made by the FSA since its inception (IMF, 2003, p.30). 
Nevertheless, as argued in Hall (1999d and 2003a), there is still a case for formalising the 
relationships between the FSA and the other regulatory bodies involved, with a view to 
enhancing  co-ordination  and  co-operation  and  clarifying  their  respective  roles.  For 
example, the introduction of UK-style 'memoranda of understanding', both to cover the 
form of co-operation expected from the FSA/BoJ/DIC in the event of a financial crisis
39 
and bilateral arrangements with overseas supervisors is desirable.
40 
 32 
  Another  serious  concern  raised  by  the  IMF  relates  to  the  FSA's  apparent  lack  of 
autonomy  and  poor  corporate  governance.  Accordingly,  to  minimise  the  possibility  of 
political interference, to clarify the responsibilities of the Commissioner (i.e. the 'Head') of 
the FSA and the Minister for Financial Services and to increase the accountability of the 
FSA, the IMF calls for the establishment of a Board with outside members to whom the 
Commissioner, as Chief Executive, should be accountable. They also seek a change in the 
legal framework limiting the Prime Minister's and Minister for Financial Services' roles in 
the  taking  of  decisions  on  individual  supervised institutions  to  instances  where  public 
money is involved (IMF, 2003, p.30, para.71).
41 
 
  Other  concerns  highlighted  by  the  IMF  relate  to  a  lack  of  resources  (human  and 
physical) at the FSA, the frequent rotation of staff, the limited recruitment  of outside 
specialists, its relationship with external auditors and the scope of its operations (IMF, 
2003, pp.30-31). With respect to human resources, the IMF argues that more staff should 
be  engaged  in  supervision  and  inspection  and  that  more  outside  specialists,  including 
actuaries and reinsurance specialists, should be hired. Less frequent rotation of staff would 
also  assist  in  the  continuity  of  policy.  Whilst  accepting  these  criticisms,  the  FSA,  in 
private  conversations,  claims  that,  at  least  in  respect  of  banking  inspection  and 
supervision, it is able to cope with the demands placed on it with current staffing levels. 
 
  As regards its relationship with outside auditors, the IMF is concerned that not enough 
use  is  made  of  them.  They  argue  that  auditors  should  be  asked  to  report  on  internal 
controls and similar issues on which they have expertise. In response, the FSA argues that 
full use is made of auditors within the confines of their confidentiality constraints. Maybe, 
therefore, as occurred in the UK post-BCCI (see Hall, 1999e, chapter 11), there may be a 33 
case for formally requiring external auditors to share their concerns with regulators, the 
quid pro quo for the auditors being increased protection from litigation by their clients. 
 
  Finally, in respect of its operational remit, the IMF wants its activities confined to 
regulation and supervision. Accordingly, it calls for responsibility for auditing standards to 
be transferred to an independent body outside the FSA with private sector participation, as 
is done with respect to the setting of accounting standards. 
 
  Of all the eminently sensible recommendations of the IMF, perhaps the most important 
is the call to enhance the autonomy and accountability of the FSA. This would help to 
dispel  the  fears  held  by  many  that  the  FSA  is  still  subject  to  too  much  political 
interference
42 and is largely unaccountable for its actions.
43 Moreover, the creation of a 
new Board with outside members would hopefully end the apparent feud between the 
reactionary 'old guard' (comprising mainly former MoF officials) and the more reform-





5.2   Reform of the Safety Net Arrangements 
 
 
5.2.1  Deposit Insurance Reform 
 
Of the post-2000 reforms discussed in Section 4.2.1, those which have received most
45 
attention are the decision to further delay the restoration of limited deposit protection and 
the creation of the IRCJ.
46 In respect of the former, a move supported by the IMF given 
the continued financial fragility in Japan (IMF, 2003, p.31, para.81), the result is to further 
postpone  the  return  of  some  vestiges  of  market  discipline  into  deposit  insurance 34 
arrangements, already undermined by the DICJ's failure to adopt risk-related premia and 
embrace the co-insurance principal; such measures would serve to limit the moral hazard 
created  by  the  use  of  deposit  insurance.  The  decision  to  grant  permanent  blanket 
protection to qualifying "payment and settlement deposits" beyond April 2005 is also open 
to challenge on the same grounds. Perhaps a better approach would have been to offer 100 
per cent protection on a limited amount of such deposits, an approach recently adopted in 
the UK to protect a reasonable level of "working capital" balances.
47 Co-insurance could 
then kick-in above this level until the de jure limit of  Y 10 million is reached, beyond 
which caveat emptor applies. 
 
  As for the operations of the IRCJ, the body itself is only too aware of the criticisms 
levelled at it: that it is too susceptible to political interference aimed at keeping non-viable 
firms, especially in the construction sector, and banks alive (IMF, 2003, p.23, para.51); 
and that there is no need for another public sector work out agency to work alongside the 
RCC,
48 the creation of which risks crowding-out the more experienced private sector. The 
slow take-up of its services and the limited amount spent to date by the IRCJ are also cited 
as evidence of very low demand for its services. To counter such criticisms the IRCJ has 
gone out of its way to maximise the transparency of its operations, to set tougher support 
criteria for the construction industry, to hire outside experts where necessary, to conduct 
painstakingly-detailed  due  diligence  analysis  to  determine  the  likely  viability  of 
restructured firms and fair market values of assets, and to "discipline" management and 
shareholders of any companies supported. Although only  Y 1 trillion or so of the  Y 10 
trillion available to the IRCJ has been spent so far, and only seven months remain to find 
further customers, the spread of cases taken on board to date – covering companies of 
different sizes and from different sectors of the economy – suggest that some at least of 35 
the IRCJ's claimed comparative advantages (see Appendix 1) are real. Moreover, to the 
extent that the inauguration of the ICRJ accelerated the banking industry's own efforts to 
establish distressed debt work-out units – see Section 4.3 – the money may well have been 
well spent.  
 
5.2.2  Prudential Regulation and Supervision of Banks 
Despite addressing many of the concerns raised in Hall (2003a) relating to internal and 
external  audit  and  the  balance  between  on-site  and  off-site  supervision,  as  detailed  in 
Section 4.2.2, a number of worries remain. These relate, primarily, to the determination of 
capital adequacy of Japanese banks and the operation of prompt corrective action (PCA) in 
Japan, both of which have come to the fore in recent instances of failure resolution – i.e. 
the bailout of Resona Bank and the nationalisation of Ashikaga Bank. More generally, the 
Japanese authorities appear to have somewhat further to go down the road of compliance 
with the Basel Committee's "Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision". 
 
  Starting with the issue of capital adequacy determination, it has become clear over the 
last year or so that it is the external auditors, through their judgements on the appropriate 
amounts of DTAs to allow for inclusion in capital, who have become the final arbiters of 
the  adequacy  of  capital.  This  follows  the  FSA's  explicit  move  to  involve  them  more 
closely in such activities (FSA, 2003b). In the case of Resona Bank, for example, the 
auditors to the bank, Shin Nihon & Co.,
49 refused to accept the earnings forecasts of the 
bank, which meant that the bank's value of DTAs (which represented around 70 per cent 
of Tier 1 capital) faced a similar downgrading; in the event only three years of DTAs 
(equivalent  to  Y 400  billion)  were  accepted.  This  meant  that  the bank's  overall  capital 
adequacy ratio fell to around 2 per cent, well below the 6 per cent claimed by the bank and 36 
the minimum of 4 per cent demanded of all "domestic-only" bank operators in Japan.
50 
The capital deficiency duly prompted the bank to seek help from the FSA and, under the 
emergency legislation designed to ward off a systemic crisis – see Appendix 1 - Y 2 trillion 
of public funds was injected by the DIC, thereby raising the bank's capital adequacy ratio 
above 10 per cent.
51 The action taken by Shin Nihon was apparently made independently 
of the FSA and reflected a new resolve of the accounting profession in Japan to adopt a 
more rigorous, and realistic, approach to their audit function. This, of course, was driven 
in part by a growing fear of litigation if their work is subsequently found wanting but, 
nevertheless, represents a welcome improvement in corporate governance arrangements in 
Japan. 
 
  Further evidence of the auditors' newly-found virility was not long in coming. On 29 
November 2003, Ashikaga Bank, the tenth largest regional bank in Japan, admitted that it 
was insolvent, with liabilities exceeding assets by  Y 102 billion at end-September 2003. 
This followed an FSA inspection which identified under-provisioning of Y 95 billion and 
the external auditors' refusal to accept any DTAs (which, at the time, amounted to 186 per 
cent of Tier 1 capital) within capital. This meant that the bank's capital adequacy ratio fell 




  Notwithstanding the welcome increase in the auditors' assertiveness, the real issue is 
why the FSA, as the regulator, is hiding behind the auditors in the determination of bank 
capital  adequacy.  Is  it  because  it  does  not  want  to  shoulder  the  responsibility  for  the 
decision-taking,  either  because  it  fears  litigation,  or  the  ensuing  hostility  from  banks, 
politicians and/or the general public? Whatever the reason, such a stance is not defensible 37 
and the FSA should "bite the bullet" and promulgate a "Prudential Note" making it clear 
that it is the final arbiter of a bank's capital adequacy. To assist in this policy, the FSA 
should clearly specify, as soon as possible, a final ruling on what maximum proportion of 
DTAs should be eligible for inclusion in regulatory capital.
53 
 
  With respect to the operation of PCA in Japan (see Table 5.1), it is clear that it is not 
functioning as intended. Apart from limiting supervisory forbearance, by prescribing, in 
part, the form of action that supervisors must take as various capital adequacy levels are 
breached, it is designed to protect tax-payers from the cost of bank failure. If it works well, 
the costs imposed on the tax-payer should be minimal, although the usage of book value 
rather than market value accounting does inevitably usually lead to some losses falling on 
the  general  public.  In  the  case  of  Japan,  however,  the  losses  have  been  substantial.
54 
Clearly, PCA was not exercised promptly enough, suggesting the trigger points for action 
are set too low and/or the remedial action taken (mandatory and otherwise) has not been 
tough enough. The design of Japan's scheme of PCA should be looked at again; it is not 
enough  simply  to  reduce  the  timescale  for  certain  types  of  remedial  action  to  be 
implemented by banks from three years to one year. 
 
  Finally, as regards Japan's compliance with the Basel Committee's "Core Principles for 
Effective  Banking  Supervision",  it  would  appear  from  the  IMF's  recent  survey  that 
additional measures are required (see Table 5.2). Apart from the need to further address 
the  pre-conditions  for  effective  banking  supervision,  because  of  the  FSA's  lack  of 
operational  and  budgetary  independence  and  the  absence  of  formal  arrangements 
governing  information  exchanges  between  the  FSA  and  the  BoJ  on  the  one  hand  and 
between Japanese and overseas regulators on the other (noted above), action is urgently 38 
required  to  redefine  regulatory  capital  (taking  on  board  the  criticisms  noted  earlier), 
improve the supervision of country risk and tighten the rules concerning large exposures.
55 
Other action suggested by the IMF is also presented in Table 5.2. 
 
  Although adoption of all these recommendations should increase the cost-effectiveness 
of banking regulation and supervision in Japan, at the end of the day it is down to the way 
in which crisis situations are actually handled within the architectural framework created 
and individual institutions are actually treated by FSA officers during routine inspections 
and off-site monitoring. Whilst the worst excesses of the previous regime of forbearance 
(see Hall, 1999a) appear to be behind us, not all are convinced that much has changed with 
the  ushering  in  of  the  new  FSA,  still  dominated  by  ex-MoF  officials  and  lacking  in 
operational independence from government. The recent events at Resona Bank, discussed 
above, have only served to fuel suspicions that the FSA is not fully in control of events, a 
charge difficult to dismiss given the opacity of the FSA's operations. Moreover, the need 
for such a rescue only three months after the creation of the bank through a merger of 
Daiwa Bank and Asahi Bank, banks widely recognised as being amongst the weakest of 
the city banks and which had benefited from previous state handouts in 1998/9, indicates 
the futility of trying to preserve desperately-weak organisations, at the expense of stronger 
institutions.  Similarly,  the  nationalisation  of  Ashikaga  Bank,  although  conducted  on  a 
more market-oriented basis – it followed an external audit and inspection by the FSA and 
resulted in the wholesale change of management and complete impoverishment of existing 
shareholders, unlike in the Resona case (Fukao, 2003) – followed years of turmoil at the 
bank, which had clocked up losses of over Y 400 billion since 1996 despite receiving state-
funded capital injections in 1998 and 1999 (see Appendix 1). At some stage, the need to 
weed out excess capacity through a cull of terminally-weak institutions will have to take 39 
priority  over  concerns  about  the  possible  consequences  for  the  regional  and  national 
economies. Similarly, some semblance of market discipline will eventually have to be 
restored through reform of the deposit insurance arrangements. 
 




Clearly,  the  authorities  deserve  praise  for  their  determination  to  speed  up  the  NPL 
resolution process, often against the wishes of the banks who are happy to wait for better 
times (whilst the zero interest rate policy persists, a factor which itself complicates matters 
by undermining the usefulness of the term "NPL") rather than risk damaging long-standing 
business relationships. The major banks, as a group, look like meeting the target set for 
them – i.e. to halve their NPL ratios between end-March 2002, when they represented 8.4 
per cent of total loans, and end-March 2005
56 and even Resona Holdings hopes to reduce 
its NPL ratio to 4 per cent by the due date.
57 The fear remains, however, that unless the 
nascent  economy  recovery  proves  sustainable  and  gathers  pace,  the  banks'  exposures, 
especially  to  SMEs,  may  cause  some  upward  rebound  in  major  banks'  NPL  ratios. 
Moreover, the authorities have yet to get to grips with the regional banks' asset appraisal 
and provisioning policies
58 and thus reduce their real NPL ratios to manageable levels. It 
should also be appreciated that the battle to quickly reduce the major banks' NPL ratios 
has  been  won  at  the  expense  of  a  serious  depletion  of  economic  capital,  given  the 
concomitant credit costs involved, thereby increasing the overall fragility of the banks 
given the size of the risks they are still running (see the results of the IMF's stress tests 
discussed in Section 3.2). This may necessitate even larger injections of public funds if 
banks' capital adequacy levels are to be boosted to international levels – see next section. 
Moreover, to the extent that debt forgiveness has been used to reduce reported NPLs, the 40 
process of structural reform in the corporate sector will have been slowed down, with 
weak companies being subsidised at the expense of stronger ones. 
 
 
5.4  Other Reform Initiatives 
 
 
Starting  with  the  BoJ's  share-buying  operations,  it  can  be  argued  that  the  broader 
objective of trying to kick-start the reform process, thereby shaming the FSA into taking 
more decisive action, was achieved, given subsequent developments at the FSA. What is 
less clear, however, is the desirability of the initiative itself. As part of an innovative 
approach to the conduct of monetary policy, designed to decelerate the pace of deflation, it 
can perhaps be defended, notwithstanding the potentially adverse impact on the quality of 
the BoJ's own assets, which has recently led the BoJ to record its first operating loss for 32 
years.
59 As a device for shoring-up the banks' balance sheets, though, it is not clear that 
this should be a central bank function.
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  As for the plans for pre-emptive capital injections, the Y 2 trillion to be set aside at the 
DIC to fund such operations is unlikely to make much impact on the overall strength of 
the regional bank sector, the intended target of the initiative. Moreover, to the extent it is 
used to finance mergers between struggling banks, it is likely to be yet another case of 
"throwing good money after bad"; the money might be better spent reducing capacity in 
the banking industry if recovery in the real economy continues, as widely expected. A 
much bolder move – see below – would have been to use the funds already available at the 
Early Strengthening Account at the DIC - Y 15 trillion remains unspent – to recapitalise 
the  major  banks  (including  regionals)  to  boost  their  capital  adequacy  levels  nearer  to 
international norms, after taking a stricter interpretation of Basel  I. Similar safeguards 41 
could be  adopted  as envisaged under current legislation, that is only weak, but sound 
banks  will  receive  support  and  management  will  have  to  meet  exacting 
profitability/efficiency targets; and the pre-emptive mechanism, obviating the need for the 
activation of the financial crisis management procedures, would be equally beneficial to 
those banks assisted in this way. 
 
  Finally,  with  respect  to  corporate  governance  arrangements,  although  the 
improvements  made  to  date  are  to  be  warmly  welcomed,  further  developments  are 
desirable. As the IMF notes, the system is still characterised by a low level of shareholder 
activism  and  few  outside  directors,  and  lacks  transparency.  And  the  relatively-small 
corporate  bond  market  and  remaining  high  degree  of  cross-shareholding  also  deter 
structural changes. Accordingly, the IMF's "wish-list" for reforms in this area, including 
the mandatory establishment of board audit committees by banks, with outside directors 
making up a majority of the Committee and from whom the Chairman is chosen, merit 
serious attention. The audit committee is expected to appoint the external auditor (subject 
to approval by the FSA) and internal auditors would be required to report to the audit 
committee. More generally, the IMF is seeking corporate governance arrangements more 
consistent with Basel Committee guidelines (IMF, 2003, pp.8-9, para.9). 42 





After a number of false dawns, the recent marked improvement in the real economy may 
well presage the return of sustainable economic growth in Japan. This has already assisted 
the banks in their own recovery through its impact on credit costs, the fiscal 2003 results 
suggesting that, for the majority of the major banks at least – doubts still surround UFJ and 
Resona – the worst is behind them. As a group, they are likely to meet the target set for 
them in respect of the halving of their NPL ratios by end-March 2005 (relative to their 
positions at end-March 2002); and most are forecasting further profits for fiscal 2004, 
notwithstanding the one-off benefits enjoyed during fiscal 2003 in the shape of tax refunds 
from the municipal government and a near 50 per cent surge in the local stock market. The 
fundamental problems, however, have not changed, causing the rating agencies to leave 
their financial strength ratings untouched. While a return to the black for most is very 
welcome news, the underlying level of profitability of the banks remains pathetically low, 
as recognised by the banks themselves in the profits forecasts. Net income growth, the 
mainstay of the banks' fortunes, will remain sluggish as long as corporate loan demand 
remains sluggish and the zero interest rate policy remains in place, thereby constraining 
banks' ability to raise lending margins. And even if the zero interest rate policy is ended, 
following the curtailment of deflation and a return to inflation – and this time round, such 
action is unlikely to be taken until economic recovery is firmly entrenched – what the 
banks may gain on the net interest income front may be swallowed up by losses incurred 
on Japanese government bold holdings. Moreover, even if declining credit costs continue 
with respect to loan exposures related to large corporate borrowers, there is a real danger 
that exposures to SMEs will extend the NPL pain, both for the major banks and regional 
banks. 43 
 
  Similarly,  the  fundamentals  on  the  capital  adequacy  front  have  not  changed, 
notwithstanding the banks' renewed ability to generate at least some funds internally and 
reduce reliance on DTAs. Given the scale of the continuing risks being run by the banks – 
notably    credit  and  market  risks  –  the  current  levels  maintained  by  most  banks  are 
woefully inadequate, particularly if a less-charitable view is taken by the authorities in 
connection with its interpretation of Basel I. Unwillingness to upset existing shareholders 
by  diluting  ownership  through  further  common  stock  issues  is  likely  to  continue  to 
constrain the growth in Tier 1 capital in the short- to medium-term alongside their limited 
ability to boost retained earnings. This leaves preference share issues as the likely focus of 
future capital-raising activities yet concerns have already been raised about the scale of 
previous  sales  to  affiliated  companies  and  other  financial  institutions,  the  most  likely 
source of investors; an official desire to see a further unwinding of cross-shareholdings 
and concerns about "double gearing" may stymie ambitions in this area. Yet funds have to 
be found somewhere if the current level of risk-taking continues and the repayment of 
previous publicly-funded capital injection is to proceed on time. It is far from clear that the 
banks  can  "square  the  circle"  and  meet  such  requirements  without  outside  help. 
Accordingly,  in  agreement  with  the  IMF  (see  Table  6.1),  I  recommend  widescale 
recapitalisation  of  the  (sound  parts  of  the)  banking  industry,  using  funds  already 
committed to the DIC – see next section. And, to assist the banks in their attempts to boost 
profitability,
61 I also agree with the IMF and Oyama and Shiratori (2001) that the extent of 
direct government involvement in the financial system should be scaled back, particularly 
in  respect  of  the  operation  of  the  Postal  Savings  system  (scheduled  for  (partial) 
privatisation in 2007). Moreover, a re-focusing of failure resolution policy to close down 
terminally-ill institutions and only support sound and solvent institutions, as argued for by 44 
Fukao  (2003),  would  help  to  alleviate  the  problems  caused  by  excess  capacity  in  the 
banking/finance industry. A return to sustainable economic growth should assist in this 
process by reducing policymakers' opposition to such a move on the grounds that the 
national/local  economy  will  suffer  irreparable  damage  if  such  a  policy  is  adopted. 
Invocation of the financial crisis management procedures should thus prove less frequent 
as the return to a more market-based economy gathers momentum.  
 
  Turning to the actual banking sector reform initiatives recently adopted in Japan, early 
indications are that the new financial architecture created, with the FSA at its centre, is a 
significant improvement on that which operated prior to the beginning of this century. 
Nevertheless, there is room for further improvement. It is difficult, for example, to argue 
against the IMF's call for full operational autonomy and greater accountability of the FSA 
and, maybe, financial independence for the FSA. Moreover, as called for in Hall (1999d), 
there is still a case for formalising the relationship between the FSA and other regulatory 
bodies through, for example, the introduction of UK-style 'memoranda of understanding', 
both to cover the form of co-operation expected from the FSA/BoJ/DIC in the event of a 
financial crisis and bilateral arrangements with overseas supervisors. And, if the BoJ is 
allowed to retain its supervisory function, there is a case for introducing a 'lead regulator' 
principle  to  formalise  the  co-operation  of  the  FSA  and  BoJ  in  respect  of  their 
inspection/supervision of individual banks. Finally, it would appear desirable to impose a 
requirement  on  external auditors  to  consult  more  widely  with  regulators,  especially  in 
instances where they suspect fraud or malpractice. 
 
  With respect to recent reform of the safety net, the DIC would be well advised to 
urgently consider the introduction of the co-insurance principle and risk-related premia to 45 
limit  the  moral  hazard  created.  Moreover,  the  decision  to  grant  permanent  blanket 
protection to "payment and settlement accounts" should be reconsidered. The IRCJ, in 
turn, should be robust in its defence of operational independence, highly selective in its 
choice  of  companies  to  support,  tough  in  its  treatment  of  the  management  and 
shareholders of assisted companies and fair in its determination of asset values. And the 
RCC  should  do  its  utmost  to  minimise  the  time  between  asset  purchases  and  their 
subsequent  disposal  in  the  market  place.  The  cost-effectiveness  of  the  prudential 
regulation and supervision of banks could also be increased by the FSA assuming sole 
responsibility for the determination of banks' capital adequacy (a process assisted by its 
early passing of a ruling concerning the maximum amount of DTAs that are eligible for 
inclusion in regulatory capital), the authorities reviewing the operation of PCA in Japan 
with  a  view  to  reducing  the  costs  imposed  on  tax-payers  as  a  result  of  bank  failure 
resolution  policy,  and  the  implementation  of  measures  to  boost  Japan's  degree  of 
compliance  with  the  Basle  Committee's  "Core  Principles  for  Effective  Banking 
Supervision". At the very least, this would involve the changes to the FSA's operations 
noted above if the "pre-conditions for effective banking supervision" are to be satisfied, 
plus a redefinition of regulatory capital (more in tune with the spirit if not the letter of 
Basel I), an improvement in the supervision of country risk and a tightening of the large 
exposures rules. 
 
  As regards the authorities' attempts to speed up the banks' resolution of their NPL 
problems, it would be churlish not to compliment the government and the FSA on what 
has been achieved in respect of the majority of the major banks. But, as noted earlier, 
some reservations remain. Recent events at UFJ and Resona call into question the FSA's 
assertion that it has induced standardisation in the way the major banks classify loans to 46 
large corporate borrowers and hence in their provisioning policies. There are also fears 
that exposures to SMEs will slow down the pace at which the major banks can continue to 
reduce their NPL ratios. And, of course, the FSA has yet to seriously tackle the regional 
banks'  and  co-operative  institutions'  problems  in  these  areas.  Moreover,  the  success 
achieved has come at a high cost in terms of the serious depletion of economic capital that 
has resulted. Nevertheless, the overall impact of the moves taken to date is positive, and 
the FSA should seek to consolidate the success it has achieved in respect of the major 
banks whilst, at the same time, turning its attention to the other deposit-taking institutions 
operating in Japan. 
 
  With regard to the authorities' other reform institutions, praise should perhaps be more 
muted. The BoJ's share-buying operations, for example, undoubtedly accelerated the pace 
at  which  banks  reduce  their  exposure  to  the  stock  market  and  unwound  their  cross-
shareholdings, both of which are desirable outcomes. Whether or not this should be a 
function  of  a  central  bank,  however,  is  debatable,  even  if  difficult  times  call  for 
imaginative policymaking. Similarly, in respect of the planned use of pre-emptive capital 
injections,  the  Y 2  trillion  of  financial  assistance  envisaged  is  unlikely  to  make  much 
impact on the strength of the regional bank sector. Moreover, to the extent it is used to 
shore-up very weak banks, by funding takeovers by others, it will represent a continuation 
of  a  failure  resolution  policy  more  concerned  with  preservation  of  the  weak  than 
promotion of the strong, thereby prolonging the problems associated with excess capacity 
in  the  banking  industry.  The  money  would  be  better  spent  as  part  of  a  broader 
recapitalisation  programme,  as  argued  in  Section  5  above.  Finally,  on  the  corporate 
governance  front,  the  conclusion  must  be  that  recent  developments  are  welcome,  but 
further reform is needed. 47 
 
  In conclusion, recovery in the real economy and the knock-on effects for the banks' 
fortunes, should not be used as an opportunity to slow the pace of reform; the opposite is 
required. Accelerating the pace of reform, along the lines suggested, would bring forward 
the day when Japanese banks can compete on the international stage again, unaided by 
governmental subsidies, and the authorities can safely dismantle the recent extensions to 
the safety net which have done so much to undermine market discipline in the Japanese 
financial system and thus reduce economic efficiency in the wider economy. 48 





(i)    To help boost bank profitability 
 
  :  scale back the operations of governmental financial institutions (especially the 
Postal Savings system); 
  :  re-focus failure resolution away from preservation of the weak and in favour of 
promotion  of  the  strong  by  doing  more  to  remove  excess  capacity  in  the 
banking industry; 




(ii)  To help boost capital adequacy 
 
  :  having re-defined regulatory capital (see (vi) below), those banks which remain 
solvent or are deemed systemically important but which breach the minimum 
capital adequacy requirements laid down by the Basel Committee should be 
recapitalised using, in the first instance, the Y 15 trillion remaining in the DIC's 
Early Strengthening Account. Recipient institutions would be required to meet 




(iii)  To help restore market discipline 
 
  :  scale back the scope of the safety net (i.e. the operation of the 'Too-Big-To-
Fail' policy and the extent of protection enjoyed under the deposit insurance 
arrangements – see (v)a below); 
  :  take a tougher line on shareholders and other creditors when intervening in the 
market. 49 
(iv)  To improve the regulatory and supervisory framework 
  :  introduce new mechanisms to ensure the FSA enjoys full operational autonomy 
yet is held fully accountable for its actions; 
  :  formalise the relationships between the FSA and other regulators by: 
    (a)  introducing a 'memorandum of understanding' to govern the relationships 
between the FSA/BoJ/DIC in the event of a financial crisis; and 
    (b)  negotiating  'memoranda  of  understanding'  with  all  relevant  overseas 
supervisors; 
  :  end  the  BoJ's  involvement  in  the  supervision  of  financial  institutions  by 
integrating the relevant staff with the FSA's own staff (a 'second best' solution 
to the problems posed for co-ordination and co-operation by multiple agencies 
is the establishment of a 'lead regulator' principle to govern the supervision of 
individual institutions and the removal of legal barriers to the full exchange of 
information between the FSA and the BoJ); 
  :  require  auditors  to  consult  more  closely  with  the  FSA,  particularly  if  they 
suspect fraud or malpractice by their client institutions. 
 
(v)  To increase the cost-effectiveness of the safety net 
  (a) Amend the deposit insurance law to allow for the introduction of co-insurance 
(below the normal de jure limit of protection of Y 10 million) and risk-related 
premia,  and  removal  of  the  blanket  protection  given  to  "payment  and 
settlement deposits". 
  (b) Raise the cost-effectiveness of prudential regulation and supervision by: 
    :  forcing  the  FSA  to  assume  sole  responsibility  for  the  determination  of 
banks' capital adequacy; 50 
    :  giving the FSA the power to set bank-specific capital charges (as called for 
in Basel II); 
    :  reviewing the operation of PCA in Japan with a view to reducing the costs 
imposed on tax-payers by bank failure resolution policy. 
 
(vi)  To  increase  the  extent  of  Japan's  compliance  with  the  Basel  Committee's 
"Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision" 
 
  :  introduce  new  measures  to  guarantee  the  full  operational  autonomy  and 
accountability  of  the  FSA  and  to  formalise  arrangements  for  information 
exchanges with the BoJ (necessary to help Japan meet the "Pre-conditions for 
Effective Banking Supervision", i.e. Core Principle number 1); 
  :  re-define  regulatory  capital  by  limiting  the  inclusion  of  DTAs,  excluding 
general provisions held against Category II assets and deducting all holdings of 
other credit institutions' capital instruments (necessary to comply with Core 
Principle number 6); 
  :  improve  the  supervision  of  country  risk  (necessary  to  comply  with  Core 
Principle number 11); 
  :  tighten up the large exposure limits (necessary to comply with Core Principle 
number 9); and 
  :  agree  memoranda  of  understanding  with  relevant  overseas  supervisors 
(necessary to comply with Core Principles numbers 24 and 25). 51 
(vii)  To  increase  the  extent  of  Japan's  compliance  with  the  Basel  Committee's 
guidelines on corporate governance 
 
  :  introduce further corporate governance reforms along the lines suggested by 
the IMF to embrace, inter alia, the compulsory establishment of board audit 
committees by all banks with a majority of outside directors. 52 
TABLES 53 
TABLE 2.1 : CATEGORISATION OF PRIVATE DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS 
OPERATING IN JAPAN AS OF 1.4.03* 
 
 
                  Total assets at end- 
                         March 2003 (Y  trillion) 
 
Banks    -  City Banks (7)           407 
    -  Regional Banks (64)          204 
      Second Association of Regional 
  Banks (53)             61 
      Foreign Banks (73)            43 
    -  Long-Term Credit Banks (2)           13 
    -  Trust Banks (27)              61 
      Others (5)              0.7 
 
Cooperatives  -  Shinkin Central Bank         139 
    -  Shinkin Banks (326)         
 
    -  National Federation of Credit      
  Cooperatives            19 
      Credit Cooperatives (191)       
 
    -  Shoko Chukin Bank          N.A. 
 
    -  Rokinren Bank         
      Labor Banks (21)         
 18 
 
    -  Norinchukin Bank          N.A. 
 
    -  Credit Federation of Agricultural     
  Cooperatives (46)        130 
    -  Agricultural Cooperatives (944)     
 
    -  Credit Federations of Fishery      
  Cooperatives (34)          4 




*  Figures in parentheses represent the number of institutions in each category operating 




Source:  Japanese  Bankers'  Association,  2003,  p.1;  IMF,  2003,  'Supplementary 
Information', p.5. 54 





Merged Entities  Date of Merger  New Entity Formed  Latest Developments 









































       









April 2001  Mitsubishi Tokyo 
Financial Group, 
comprising: 









Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial 
Group, 

































       
Daiwa Bank Holdings, 











































Notes:  (1)  City Bank. 
(2)  Long-Term Credit Bank. 
  (3)  Trust Bank Subsidiary. 
  (4)  Trust Bank. 




Source:  Japanese Bankers' Association, 2003, p.15. 55 
TABLE 3.1 : MOODY'S FINANCIAL STRENGTH RATINGS FOR THE MAJOR 




    Date Last Amended 
     
Mizuho Bank  E  2/7/02 
     
Tokyo Mitsubishi Bank  D-  2/7/02 
     
Mitsubishi Trust Bank  D-  16/12/02 
     
UFJ Bank  E  2/7/02 
     
Resona Bank  E  13/2/98 
     
Chuo Mitsui Trust Bank  E  3/4/00 
     
Sumitomo Mitsui Bank  E  2/7/02 
     
Sumitomo Trust Bank  D-  16/12/03 
     
Shinsei Bank  D  16/12/03 
     




Source:  Moody's Japan. 
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Financial Year  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
                           
Lending Margin [(i)]  7.1  8.9  9.8  9.2  9.7  10.8  10.7  10.0  9.6  9.7  9.4  9.8  9.4 
                           
Other Revenue [(ii)]  2.6  2.2  2.5  2.8  2.1  3.3  3.7  3.6  3.1  2.5  3.0  3.1  3.6 
                           
Operating Costs [(iii)]  7.1  7.5  7.7  7.7  7.8  7.8  8.0  8.0  7.5  7.3  7.1  7.0  7.0 
                           
Gross Profit  
   [(iv)=(i)+(ii)-(iii)] 
2.6  3.5  4.5  4.3  4.0  6.3  6.4  5.6  5.2  4.9  5.3  5.9  6.0 
                           
Loan Loss (v)  0.8  1.0  2.0  4.6  6.2  13.3  7.3  13.5  13.5  6.3  6.6  9.4  7.0 
                           
Net Operating Profit 
   [(vi)=(iv)-(v)] 
1.8  2.5  2.5  -0.4  -2.2  -7.0  -1.0  -7.9  -8.3  -1.4  -1.3  -3.5  -1.0 
                           
Realised Capital Gains [(vii))]  2.0  0.7  0  2.0  3.2  4.4  1.2  3.6  1.4  3.8  1.4  -2.4  -4.1 
                           




Source:  Japan Center for Economic Research, 2003. 57 




Indicators  Date (end-March) 
  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
             
Return on assets (pre-tax)  -0.6  -0.9  0.3  0.1  -0.7  -0.6 
Return on equity (pre-tax)  -20.0  -25.1  6.8  1.2  -19.5  -19.4 
Interest margin to gross income  51.7  53.6  46.7  61.3  63.4  60.0 
Non-interest expenses to gross income  80.3  86.2  88.5  83.2  91.3  N.A. 
Personnel expenses to non-interest income  49.5  48.3  48.1  47.2  46.7  46.3 
Trading and fee income to total income  7.7  8.4  7.8  11.6  13.6  16.6 
Spread between average lending and deposit rates
(1)             
  :  City banks (7)  1.6  1.6  1.7  1.7  1.7  1.6 
  :  Trust banks (5)  0.8  0.8  1.0  1.1  1.1  1.2 
  :  Long-term credit banks (3)  0.7  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.7  1.5 
  :  Regional banks (64)  2.0  2.1  2.1  2.1  2.1  2.1 








Source:  IMF, 2003 ('Supplementary Information', Table 4. p.8). 
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TABLE 3.4 : CAPITAL ADEQUACY





(2)  Date (end-March) 
  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
             
City Banks:  Internationally active (5)  9.3 (4.7)  11.9 (6.6)  12.4 (6.9)  11.7 (6.7)  11.1 (6.0)  10.3 (5.3) 
  Not internationally active (2)
(3)  --  --  12.7 (8.7)  12.0 (8.4)  8.7 (4.4)  6.7 (3.5) 
Trust Banks:     Internationally active (2)  10.8 (6.1)  13.1 (7.7)  11.4 (7.0)  11.7 (6.7)  10.9 (6.2)  11.0 (6.1) 
  Not internationally active (3)  13.5 (12.9)  8.2 (7.6)  11.7 (7.2)  11.2 (6.6)  10.3 (5.7)  7.1 (4.1) 
Long-term  
Credit Banks:     
Internationally active (0) 













Regional Banks:  Internationally active (10) 













Regional Banks II:  Internationally active (0) 













All Banks:  Internationally active (18) 














(4)  Internationally active (7) 
















(1)  Figures are provided for both total regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets and, in parentheses, for Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets. 
(2)  Figures in parentheses represent the number of institutions included as of end-March 2003. 
(3)  The end-March 2003 figure includes the Saitama-Resona Bank. 
(4)  Comprising the Mizuho Group (Mizuho Bank, Mizuho Corporate Bank and Mizuho Trust), the MTFG (Tokyo-Mitsubishi Bank and Mitsubishi Trust), the UFJ Group 




Source: IMF, 2003 ('Supplementary Information', Table 5, p.9).   59 




Period  (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v)  (vi)  (vii) 
  Core Capital
(1)  Market Value of 
Shares Held 
Book Value of 
Shares Held 
[=0.6((ii)-(iii))







               
End-March  '91  30.2  77.7  33.1  26.7  57.0  0  0 
  "           '92  31.3  56.4  34.5  13.1  44.4  0  0 
  "  '93  31.8  56.4  34.5  13.1  44.9  0  0 
  "  '94  32.3  61.9  36.5  15.2  47.5  0  0 
  "  '95  32.3  52.0  39.8  7.3  39.6  0  0 
  "  '96  27.9  64.3  43.0  12.8  40.7  0  0 
  "  '97  28.5  54.1  42.9  6.7  35.2  0  0 
  "  '98  24.5  50.8  45.7  3.1  27.6  0  0.3 
  "  '99  33.7  47.1  42.7  2.6  36.3  8.4  6.3 
  "  '00  35.2  54.5  44.4  6.1  41.3  8.1  6.9 
  "  '01  36.7  44.5  44.3  0.1  36.8  7.3  7.1 
  "  '02  29.3  34.4  34.4  0  29.3  10.7  7.2 




(1)  Equivalent to unconsolidated Tier 1 capital. 




Source:  Federation of Bankers Associations of Japan (various); Fukao, 2003. 60 
TABLE 3.6 : "BAD LOANS", WHEN DEFINED AS "RISK MANAGEMENT  
  LOANS", OF JAPANESE BANKS BY INDUSTRY GROUPING, 


















% of Total 
Loans 
      6 PDL
3  3 PDL
4       
               
City Banks
5  6  601  6,656  247  7,490  14,994  7.1 
               
Long-term 
Credit Banks 
2  16  176  22  65  280  4.2 
               
Trust Banks  5  125  776  27  1,332  2,261  6.2 
               
Major Banks 
Sub-Total 
13  742  7,609  296  8,888  17,534  6.9 




(11)  (725)  (7,433)  (274)  (8,822)  (17,255)  (7.0) 




64  811  5,774  124  3,383  10,091  7.5 
               
Regional 
Banks II 
51  407  1,994  25  1,027  3,453  8.3 
               




1.  i.e. loans to borrowers in legal bankruptcy. 
2.  i.e. loans on which interest has not been collected and is not recognised as earnings, excluding loans to 
borrowers in legal bankruptcy and loans on which payment of interest is in a grace period for the 
purpose of reconstructing the borrowers. 
3.  i.e. past due loans in arrears by six months or more. 
4.  i.e. past due loans in arrears by more than three months but less than six months. 
5.  Figures for the Mizuho Group and UFJ Bank include those NPLs transferred to subsidiary companies 
for corporate revitalisation. 
6.  i.e. excluding the Shinsei Bank and Aozora Bank. 




Source:  FSA, 2004, the "Reference". 61 
TABLE 3.7 :  THE JAPANESE BANKING SECTOR'S NON-PERFORMING  
        LOANS, AS DEFINED UNDER THE FINANCIAL  
        RECONSTRUCTION LAW, AS AT END-SEPTEMBER 2003 










(i.e. "Classified Assets") 
NPLs as % 
Total Credit 
Exposure 
    "Bankrupt/ 
De Facto 
Bankrupt" 
"Doubtful"  "Special 
Attention" 
Total   
             
City Banks
1  232,398  1,951  5,496  7,737  15,184  6.53 
             
Long-term Credit 
Banks 
6,958  24  170  89  284  4.08 
             
Trust Banks  38,097  247  663  1,365  2,274  5.97 
             
Major Banks Sub-
Total 
277,453  2,221  6,329  9,191  17,742  6.39 
             
(Major 11 Banks)
2  (270,496)  (2,198)  (6,159)  (9,102)  (17,458)  (6.45) 
             
Regional Banks
3  137,726  2,371  4,460  3,396  10,227  7.43 
             
Regional Banks II  42,443  975  1,477  1,048  3,500  8.25 
             




1.  Figures for the Mizuho Group and UFJ Bank include those NPLs transferred to subsidiary companies 
for corporate revitalisation. 
2.  i.e. excluding the Shinsei Bank and Aozora Bank. 




Source:  FSA, 2004, Table 2. 
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TABLE 3.8 :  THE EVOLUTION OF THE "BAD" (i.e. "RISK MANAGEMENT") 
        LOANS OF THE JAPANESE DEPOSIT-TAKING SECTOR, 1992-2003 
 
 
Date  "Bad" Loans 
Outstanding 
(Y  billion) 
Stock of Specific 
Provisions Outstanding 
(Y  billion) 
Estimate of "Problem 
Loans to be Disposed of"
1 
 (Y  billion) 
       
End of March 1992  7,000-8,000
2  --  -- 
End of March 1993  8,400
2  --  -- 
End of March 1994  10,500
2  --  -- 
End of September 1994  13,300
2  --  -- 
End of March 1995  11,640
2  --  -- 
End of September 1995  38,086
3  6,961  18,587
4 
















End of March 1998 















End of March 1999  38,656  14,802  N.A. 
End of March 2000  41,367
16  11,500
16  N.A. 
End of March 2001  43,448
17  10,039
17  N.A. 
End of March 2002  53,049
18  10,375
18  N.A. 
End of March 2003  45,676
18  8,569




1.  This figure represents an estimate by the Ministry of Finance of the scale of loans for which possible 
losses have not been provided nor that are likely to be covered by collateral (i.e. loan losses considered 
"irrecoverable" and not provided for). 
2.  Ministry of Finance estimate of "nonperforming loans" for the 21 largest banks. Figures include claims 
against  customers  who  went  bankrupt  and  claims  on  which  interest  payments  were  more  than  six 
months overdue due to the suspension of interest payments, but exclude "restructured loans" (i.e. those 
on which interest payments have been cut) and the bad debts of affiliates. 
3.  Figures include "restructured loans" (i.e. loans on which interest rates have been reduced to below the 
ruling  official  discount  rate)  for  the  first  time  and  now  cover  all  Japanese  deposit-taking  financial 
institutions (i.e. city banks, long-term credit banks, trust banks, regional banks and co-operatives). 
4.  The figure is inclusive of possible losses (estimated at Y 7,700 billion) resulting from exposure to the 
eight jusen companies. 
5.  The figures exclude the Kizu Cooperative (with about  Y 1,190 billion in problem loans), the Fukui 
Prefecture First Credit Cooperative (Y 2.6 billion), the Osaka Credit Cooperative (Y 270 billion), and 
Taiheiyo Bank (Y 330 billion). 
6.  The  figure  excludes  loans  to  borrowers  to  which  the  lending  bank(s)  is  extending  help  (including 
forgiving loans), estimated at Y 3,795 billion for all "major" banks (i.e. excluding regional banks and 
co-operatives) at end of March 1996. 
7.  Loans to jusen companies are excluded, as are the Kizu Credit Cooperative (with approximately Y 1,190 
billion  in  problem  loans),  the  Osaka  Credit  Cooperative  (Y 270  billion),  the  Kenmindaiwa  Credit 
Cooperative (Y 15 billion), and Sanyo Credit Cooperatives (Y 17 billion). 
8.  The figure excludes loans to borrowers to which the lending bank is extending help (including forgiving 
loans),  estimated  at  Y 3,724  billion  for  all  "major"  banks  (i.e.  excluding  regional  banks  and  co-
operatives) at end of September 1996. 
9.  The figures exclude the Hanwa Bank (with around Y 190 billion in problem loans), the Sanpuku Credit 
Cooperative (Y 26 billion), and the Hanshin Labor Credit Cooperative (Y 3.5 billion). 63 
10.  The  figure  excludes  loans  to  borrowers  to  which  the  lending  bank(s)  is  extending  help  (including 
forgiving loans), estimated at Y 3,373 billion at end of March 1997 for all "major" banks (i.e. excluding 
co-operatives but including regional banks for the first time). 
11.  The figures exclude the Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, Hanwa Bank, Hanshin Labor Credit Cooperative, 
Tokai Credit Cooperative, Toki Credit Cooperative, Kitakyushu Credit Cooperative, Kanagawa Credit 
Cooperative, Tanabe Credit Cooperative, and the Choginosaka Credit Cooperative. 
12.  The figure excludes loans to borrowers to which the lending bank(s) is extending help, estimated at 
Y 3,084 billion at end of September 1997 for all major banks (as defined in note 10). 
13.  The figures exclude the Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, Tokuyo City Bank, Kyoto Kyoei Bank, Naniwa 
Bank, Fukutoku Bank, Midori Bank, and 32 credit companies whose assets and liabilities have been 
transferred to other institutions. 
14.  The figure excludes loans to borrowers to which the lending bank(s) is extending help, estimated at 
Y 2,015 billion at end of March 1998 for all Japanese deposit-taking institutions. 
15.  The figure was provided privately to me by the FSA. 
16.  The figures exclude the Nippon Credit Bank. 
17.  The figures include the Nippon Credit Bank but exclude the Tokyo Sowa Bank, Niigata Chuo Bank and 
bankrupted co-operatives. 




Sources: Hall, 2000; Financial Supervisory/Services Agency (various). 
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TABLE 3.9 :  TRENDS IN THE JAPANESE BANKING SECTOR'S NPLs, AS 
      DEFINED UNDER THE FINANCIAL RECONSTRUCTION LAW, 
















               




(i.e. City Banks, 
Long-term Credit 



































































































































































               




1.  Figures for the Shinsei Bank and Aozora Bank are excluded for end-Mar.'99, and figures for the Aozora 
Bank are also excluded for end-Mar.'00. Both banks' figures have been included since. 
2.  Figures in parentheses exclude the Shinsei Bank and Aozora Bank. 




Source: FSA, 2004. 65 






Bank Grouping  Date (end-March) 
  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
               
City Banks  3.6  4.8  5.2  15.0  5.4  9.4  7.8 
               
Trust Banks  6.0  8.4  11.0  8.7  7.5  9.5  7.5 
               
Long-term Credit Banks  5.4  10.0  9.1  9.0  10.0  9.6  6.2 
               
Regional Banks  2.4  3.7  4.9  5.6  7.0  7.7  7.7 
               
Regional Banks II  3.8  5.3  5.5  6.7  8.2  9.0  8.9 
































Source: IMF, 2003 (main text, p.14, and 'Supplementary Information', p.10).  66 
TABLE 3.11 : RESULTS OF IMF STRESS TESTS USING PUBLISHED END- 




Type of  
Stress Test 
Nature of Shock  Average Impact on Institutional Groupings
(1) 
    City Banks  Regional Banks  Cooperative 
Central Banks 
         
Market risk 
 
  : equity 
 
 
  : interest rate 
 
 
20% decline in 
prices 
 
100 basis points 



































(1)  In terms of the percentage loss of shareholder equity which results (figures in parentheses represent the 




Source:  IMF, 2003 ('Summary of IMF Staff Stress Test Results', Box 4, p.20). 67 
TABLE 3.12 : RESULTS OF IMF STRESS TESTS USING PUBLISHED END- 




Type of  
Stress Test 
Nature of Shock  Average Impact on Institutional Groupings
(1) 
    City Banks  Regional Banks  Cooperative 
Central Banks 
         
Market risk 
 
  : equity 
 
 
  : interest rate 
 
 
20% decline in 
prices 
 
100 basis points 






































(1)  In terms of the percentage loss of shareholder equity which results (figures in parentheses represent the 
loss as a percentage of shareholder equity excluding deferred tax assets). 




Source:  IMF, 2003 ('Supplementary Information', Box 1, p.3). 68 
TABLE 4.1 : THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF BANKING REGULATION 




Prime Minister's Office     
     
     
     
Financial Services Agency
(1)    Bank of Japan 
Functions:    Functions: 
•licensing of private financial    •on-site examination of client financial 
 Institutions     institutions holding current accounts with it 
•inspection and supervision of 
 financial institutions   
  •liquidity assistance to promote financial 
 stability 
•resolution of problem banks,
(2) 
 securities firms and insurance 
 companies 
   
•financial crisis management     
•regulation of financial markets
(3)     
•financial system planning     
     
    Deposit Insurance Corporation 
    Functions: 
    •depositor protection 




(1)  An agency, under the Cabinet Office, which began operations in July 2000 following the assumption of 
the financial planning responsibilities previously performed by the Financial Planning Bureau of the 
Ministry of Finance, and the licensing, inspection and supervision functions previously performed by 
the Financial Supervisory Agency. It also absorbed the Financial Reconstruction Commission in 
January 2001. 
(2)  This also involves the Resolution and Collection Corporation and, in the near future, will also embrace 
the Banks' Shareholding Acquisition Corporation. 
(3)  Carried out through the Securities Exchange Surveillance Commission, which was absorbed from the 




Source:  Hall, 2003a, Figure 2. 69 
TABLE 4.2 : RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE FINANCIAL SUPERVISORY AGENCY, THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE, THE 
BANK OF JAPAN AND THE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION IN 1998 
 
 
  Notification of temporary loans 
Submission and perusal of 
examination documents 
Bank of Japan 
Request to take measures to maintain 
the financial system stability, for 
example, supplying liquidity to 
financial institutions (when decision 
made in consultation with the Financial 




Prime Minister's Office 
 
Authority delegated 
(excluding authority to 
grant and revoke 
licenses) 
Prime Minister 
Financial Supervisory Agency 
(Commissioner) 
 
Inspection and supervision of 
private financial institutions 
Ministry of Finance 
(Minister of Finance) 
 
Planning and formulation for the financial 
system and securities and exchange system 
Mutual co-operation 
•Close communication 
 (Commissioner ↔ Minister of Finance) 
•Express opinions on planning and formulation 
 (Commissioner → Minister  of Finance 
•Request information for use in planning and formulation 
 (Commissioner ← Minister of Finance) 
•Post notification, consultation 
(Commissioner → Minister of Finance) 
Approval of insurance 
premium rate 
Approval of changes in 
bylaws 
Approval of special financial assistance 








Financial assistance  Premiums 
Private Financial Institutions 
•Temporary loans 
•Loans to financial institutions and other measures 
 to maintain the financial system stability 
•Examination 
Loans 
Source:  Hall, 2003a, Figure 1. 70 






Capital adequacy  
Ratio trigger 
Action to be taken 







       
1  Less than 8%  Less than 4%  To order the formulation and implementation of a 
management improvement plan 
2  Less than 4%  Less than 2%  To order such measures or implement such 
restrictions as: 
•  formulation of a plan to increase capital 
•  restraint on the increase of total assets or 
reduction of total assets 
•  prohibition on entering new business fields 
•  curtailment of current business operations 
•  prohibition on opening new offices and 
curtailment of offices currently operated 
•  curtailment of business activities of subsidiaries 
and overseas affiliated companies, and prohibition 
on establishing such entities 
•  restraint or prohibition on paying dividends 
•  restraint on paying bonuses to directors and other 
senior officers 
•  restraint or prohibition on taking deposits at high 
interest rates 
3  Less than 2%  Less than 1%  To order reductions in businesses, a merger or 
closure 
4  Less than 10%  Less than 0%  Usually,






(1)  To be adopted by banks operating overseas whether through branches or subsidiaries. 
(2)  The original 'national standard' ratio was calculated as the sum of capital plus certain reserves as a 
percentage of the daily average of total assets less some special reserves. Under the subsequent 
revisions, the numerator included debt raised through the issue of subordinated debentures but excluded 
special reserves and unrealised gains on securities holdings. Moreover, the denominator was eventually 
represented by the 'total of weighted risk assets', as calculated under the BIS 'rules' (see Hall, 1993, 
p.189). 
(3)  To be adopted by those banks without foreign branches or subsidiaries. 
(4)  These actions, however, cannot be taken in the following cases: (i) if the net value of assets, as with 
unrealised gains of the financial institution, is positive; and (ii) even when the net value of assets, as 
with unrealised gains, is negative but is expected to become positive once allowance is made for 
implementation of management improvement plans and other specific measures, the rates of business 
income and expenditure, profitability and bad debt ratios. 
(5)  A business suspension can also be ordered, even when a financial institution does not belong to this 
class, when the net value of assets, including unrealised losses, is negative (or when it is clearly 




Source:  Hall, 2003a, Table 2. 
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TABLE 5.2 : IMF'S RECOMMENDED ACTION PLAN TO IMPROVE JAPAN'S 
OBSERVANCE OF THE BASEL COMMITTEE'S "CORE 
PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE BANKING SUPERVISION" 
 
 
Reference Principle  Recommended Action 
     
CP 1.2  Independence  Consider setting up a board for the FSA (as with 
the SESC) to help ensure visible autonomy and 
accountability. 
To guarantee budgetary independence, the 
supervised institutions should be charged by the 
FSA for the costs of supervision. 
CP 1.6  Information sharing  Formalise arrangements for regular exchange of 
information with the Bank of Japan. An 
obligation for external auditors to inform the 
supervisor of any material finding should be 
embodied in law. 
CP 2  Permissible activities  Extend full supervisory authority of the FSA to 
GFIs. 
CP 4  Control of banks  Need for FSA approval of an increase in a 
significant holding. 
CP 5  Investments by banks  Need for FSA approval of amount of investments 
in relation to the bank's capital. 
CP 6  Capital adequacy  Change definition of capital to limit inclusion of 
DTA. General provisions for Category II assets 
should not be in Tier-2. The capital adequacy 
ratio for domestic banks should be at least eight 
per cent. 
CP 8  Loan evaluation and loan-
loss provisioning 
Loans should be valued on the basis of the net 
present value of expected recoveries. 
CP 9  Large exposure limits  Limits should be reduced. 
CP 11  Country risk  Country risk should be regularly reported and 
supervised. 
CP 15  Money laundering  New customer identification law will need to be 
applied effectively. 
CP 19  Validation of supervisory 
information 
Need for the FSA to have the authority to appoint, 
or oppose the appointment of, an external auditor. 
CP 21  Accounting standards  Need for the FSA to have the right to revoke the 
license of an external auditor. 
CP 24  Host country supervision  Need for recognition in the law of the rights of 
supervisors to exchange information. 
CP 25  Supervision over foreign 
banks' establishments 
Introduce more formalised arrangements for the 




Source:  IMF, 2003, Appendix I, pp.27-28. 
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TABLE 6.1 :  THE IMF'S "KEY POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS" FOR 






Asset quality and bank capital 
  Further strengthen banks' provisioning for NPLs, including by extending the use of forward-looking 
expected loss estimates. 
  Required provisions to be a tax deductible cost. 
  Limit the use of deferred tax assets in calculating bank capital. 
  General provisions in respect of "Category II" loans should be excluded from Tier 2 capital. 
 
Bank recapitalisation 
  Encourage banks to raise from the markets the additional capital needed to meet requirements due to the 
stricter treatment of deferred tax assets and provisioning. 
  Recapitalise those systemically important banks that are unable to raise sufficient capital in the market 
to at least eight per cent. 
  Require recapitalised banks to bring in new management and meet profitability targets (targets for SME 
lending to be discontinued). 
  Gradually raise the minimum capital requirement for domestic banks to at least eight per cent. 
  Wind-down (or merge) non-viable banks. 
 
Bank governance 
  Require banks to adopt corporate governance reforms consistent with the Basel Committee's guidelines, 
including outside directors and a board audit committee. 
 
Corporate restructuring 
  Encourage banks to set up subsidiary "work-out" companies (already in train). 
  Develop further the market for distressed debt by having the Resolution and Collection Corporation 
(RCC) and the Industrial Revitalization Corporation of Japan (IRCJ) serve as a catalyst for transferring 
impaired assets from the banks to the private sector (already in train). 
 
Supervision 
  Reform the governance of the supervisory process to give the FSA full operational autonomy and 
confine its responsibilities to supervision. 
  Provide additional resources to the FSA and continue to enhance its human capital. 
  FSA to make greater use of external auditors of financial institutions. 
  FSA to formalise the arrangements for information exchanges with the BoJ and other regulatory bodies. 
 
Government involvement in the financial sector 
  Reduce government involvement in the financial sector by restricting the activities of the postal savings 






Source:  Adapted from IMF, 2003, Box 2, p.7. 73 
THE APPENDIX:  DEPOSIT INSURANCE ARRANGEMENTS 




The Role of the Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan (DICJ) 
 
 
The  DICJ  was  established  on  1  July  1971  as  an  operating  agency  of  Japan's  deposit 
insurance system under the Deposit Insurance Law of April 1971. Its objectives are "to 
protect depositors and other parties, secure the intermediary functions of failed financial 
institutions  in  the  payment  and  settlement  system,  and  maintain  an  orderly  financial 
system". It does this by: providing for the payment of deposit insurance claims and the 
purchase of deposits and other claims in the event that repayment of deposits is suspended 
by financial institutions; providing appropriate financial assistance to facilitate mergers or 
other resolutions of failed financial institutions; providing for financial administration for 
failed financial institutions; providing for the succession of business of failed financial 
institutions; and establishing a system of appropriate measures to be taken in a financial 
crisis. 
 
  The functions of the DICJ have grown recently as a result of various amendments to 
the Deposit Insurance Law and enactment of new laws relating to the financial system 
[e.g. the "Financial Revitalization Law" and the "Early Strengthening Law" of 1998 - see 
Hall, 1999] to embrace, for example, additional funding relating to the resolution of failed 
financial  institutions,  including  tasks  concerned  with  financial  administration  and  the 
operation  of  a  bridge  bank,  and  capital  injection  as  a  temporary  measure  for  the 
revitalisation of the financial system. 74 
The current operations of the DICJ embrace the following: 
 
 
1.  Collection of insurance premiums – the current insurance premium rate is 0.09% for 
"payment and settlement deposits" and 0.08% for "general deposits" [the payment of a 
"special"  premium  rate  (of  0.036%)  introduced  in  June  1996  ceased  at  the  end  of 
March 2002 – see Hall, 1999]. 
 
2.  Reimbursement of insured deposits and other money – in principle, up to the de jure 
limit of  Y 10 million in principal plus interest per depositor per financial institution 
unless  alternative  arrangements  are  in  place.  Under  the  "blanket  guarantee" 
arrangements introduced in June 1996, for example, all deposits were fully protected 
until end-March 2001. Since then, the Deposit Insurance Law has been amended to 
allow for continuation of blanket coverage for certain types of deposits in accordance 
with the following schedule: for the period until end-March 2002 all deposits enjoyed 
full  protection;  from  1  April  2002  until  end-March  2005,  "specific  deposits"  (i.e. 
current deposits, ordinary deposits and specified deposits) will continue to enjoy full 
protection although "other deposits" (e.g. time deposits and instalment savings) will 
only be subject to the Y 10 million level of protection operated earlier; from 1 April 
2005 onwards, all deposits other than "payment and settlement deposits" satisfying 
certain conditions (i.e. they bear no interest, are redeemable on demand and normally 
provide payment and settlement services), which will continue to enjoy full protection, 
will  only  be  covered  up  to  the  limit  of  Y 10  million  per  depositor  per  financial 
institution. In March 2002, an additional  Y 10 trillion was added to the  Y 17 trillion 
available to reimburse depositors of failed institutions. 75 
3.  Provision of financial assistance. In the event of institution failure, financial assistance 
can be provided to an assuming financial institution and/or a bank holding company 
that  purchases  the  assets  and  assumes  the  liabilities  of/or  merges  with  the  failed 
financial institution. The financial assistance may take the form of a monetary grant, 
loan  or  deposit  of  funds,  purchase  of  assets,  guarantee  or  assumption  of  debts, 
subscription of preferred stock or loss sharing. As of 18 June 2003, financial assistance 
had been provided in 180 cases – see Table A1 – involving grants totalling  Y 18.7 
trillion and asset purchases of  Y 6.3 trillion. For the first time in 12 years, no DTIs 
failed in fiscal 2002 – see Table A2. 
    Financial  assistance  may  also  be  provided  in  "financial  crisis"  situations  –  see 
below – and to strengthen the capital bases of financial institutions (under the "Early 
Strengthening Law" of 1998 which superseded the "Financial Function Stabilisation 
Law"  of  February  1998).  Capital  injections  made  through  the  latter  route,  through 
(RCC) purchases of preferred stock and/or subordinated bonds (or loans), amounted to 
Y 1.82 trillion in March 1998 (see Table A3) (Y 844.6 billion has since been repaid), 
with Y 8.6 trillion subsequently being made (as of 9 May 2003) (Y 300 billion has since 
been repaid) under the Early Strengthening Law – see Table A4. 
    Assistance  provided  in  "financial  crisis"  situations  has  resulted  in  the  DICJ 
(through the RCC) subscribing Y 1.96 trillion to the preferred and common shares of 
Resona Bank, in response to an application from the bank, in June 2003 [under Article 
102,  para.1(1),  of  the  Deposit  Insurance  Law  of  May  2000  which  put  on  to  a 
permanent footing the temporary financial crisis management provisions introduced in 
1998 and scheduled for expiry at end-March 2001]. 
    Finally, the DICJ (again, through the RCC) can provide (until end-March 2005) 
financial assistance, via asset purchases, to "sound" financial institutions under Article 76 
53 of the "Financial Revitalization Law" of 1998; and, under the "Special Measures 
Law for the Promotion of Organizational Restructuring" of 2003, the DICJ can inject 
capital  into  financial  institutions  pursuing  organisational  restructurings  through 
mergers, etc. Assistance through the former route has been provided to 170 institutions 
since April 1999 (as of end-March 2003) with  Y 260.6 billion being paid for assets 
with principal totalling Y 3.39 trillion – see Table A5. And the first call on funds under 
the latter law was made in April 2003 when Kanto Bank and Tsukuba Bank merged to 
form the Kanto Tsukuba Bank. 
 
4.  Purchases of deposits and other claims. The DICJ is empowered to purchase deposits 
and  other  claims  not  covered  by  deposit  insurance  (e.g.  the  principal  of  insurable 
deposits  in  excess  of  Y 10  million,  plus  accrued  interest,  or  non-insurable  foreign 
currency  deposits,  plus  accrued  interest)  from  financial  institutions  that  have  been 
subject to an insurable contingency, in response to requests from depositors, etc. If the 
amount recovered by the DICJ from purchased deposits and other claims (excluding 
the expenses incurred in the purchase) exceeds the "estimated proceeds payment" (i.e. 
the amount due to depositors) the surplus is refunded to the depositors by way of a 
"settlement payment" (see DICJ, 2004, p.xxi). 
 
5.  Operation as a "financial administrator". When a financial institution fails and the 
Commissioner  of  the  FSAJ  issues  an  "order  for  management"  (i.e.  orders  that  the 
business or assets of the financial institution be placed under the management of a 
financial institution), the DICJ may be appointed as a financial administrator (under 
Article  78,  para.2,  of  the  Deposit  Insurance  Law).  This  involves,  inter  alia,  the 
execution  of  the  operations  of  the  failed  institutions,  the  selection  of  assuming 
financial institutions and the smooth transfer of business, and the pursuit of liability 77 
against former executives of the failed financial institutions. Management of the failed 
institutions has to end within one year of the date of issue of the management order, 
through  transfer  of  the  institution's  business  or  other  means,  although  a  year's 
extension to this deadline may be granted, subject to the approval of the Commissioner 
of the FSAJ. Between fiscal 1999 and fiscal 2002, the DICJ operated as a financial 
administrator for a total of 10 DTIs. 
 
6.  The operation of bridge banks. The DICJ is empowered to establish bridge banks, as 
its  own  subsidiaries,  which  provisionally  assume  the  business  of  failed  financial 
institutions under management in order to provisionally maintain and continue their 
operation until a private sector counterpart can be identified and the business transfer 
transaction completed (in principle, within two years from the date of the management 
order, with the possibility of a further year's extension). The business transfer can be 
completed  through  merger  of  the  bridge  bank,  transfer  of  its  business,  transfer  of 
shares, dissolution through a resolution at a shareholders' general meeting, or by other 
means.  The  DICJ  may  also  provide  loans  to  and  guarantee  the  borrowings  of  the 
bridge  bank,  and  compensate  for  any  losses  incurred  in  conducting  operations,  as 
stipulated in Cabinet Orders. The Bridge Bank of Japan (BBJ), the first bridge bank to 
be set up, was duly established as a 100 per cent subsidiary of the DICJ in March 2002 
to take over the operations of Ishikawa Bank and Chubu Bank. 
 
7.  Operations taken in response to financial crisis. If the failure of a financial institution 
poses an extremely serious threat to the stability  of the  financial system and local 
and/or national economies, the Prime Minister may invoke the provisions of the law 
(Article 102) and order the DICJ, on the advice of the Financial System Management 
Council, to take one or more of the following actions: 78 
  (i)  purchase the shares, etc. of specified financial institutions which have neither 
failed nor been deemed insolvent; 
  (ii)  provide  financial  assistance  to  failed  financial  institutions  and/or  financial 
institutions with a capital deficit in excess of the pay-out cost; and 
  (iii)  acquire all the shares of failed financial institutions with a capital deficit (i.e. 
temporary nationalisation). 
In  case  (ii),  an  order  for  management  by  a  financial  administrator  has  to  be  issued 
immediately ; and in scenario (iii), the FSAJ would appoint new directors and auditors of 
the bank under "special crisis management", and they may proceed with necessary civil 
and criminal procedures to clarify the managerial liability of its former executives. This 
arrangement  should  be  ended  as  soon  as  possible  by  transferring  the  business  to  an 
assuming financial institution, etc. 
  Type (i) action, as noted above, occurred for the first time in June 2003 when Y 1.96 
trillion was injected into Resona Bank. And type (iii) action was taken in respect of the 
Long-Term  Credit  Bank  and  Nippon  Credit  Bank  in  1998,  both  of  which  were 
subsequently transferred to new private sector owners in 2002 (i.e. to the Ripplewood 
Group and a local consortium led by Softbank respectively), and again in November 2003 
in respect of Ashikaga Bank. 
 
8.  On-site inspections of financial institutions. The DICJ is authorised, under Article 137, 
para.6, of the Deposit Insurance Law, to carry out such on-site inspections if the Prime 
Minister/FSA  deem  it  necessary  to  ensure  that  the  provisions  of  the  law  are 
implemented efficiently. The scope of the inspections includes: (i) checking to see if 
the payment of insurance premiums is being made properly; (ii) checking if adequate 
measures have been taken to prepare databases and improve information systems for 
aggregating deposits held by the same depositors; and (iii) identifying the estimated 79 
amounts that can be repaid on deposits and other claims when a financial institution 
fails.  An  inspection  department  was  duly  established  by  the  DICJ in July  2003  to 
enhance its inspections, which began in January 2003. 
 
9.  Asset  investigations.  The  DICJ,  in  conjunction  with  the  RCC,  carries  out  asset 
investigations when it believes the assets of debtors are likely to be concealed. In fiscal 
year 2002, for example, the DICJ investigated 296 cases and uncovered Y 48 billion in 
hidden assets of debtors. This will further add to the list of criminal suits being brought 




Group Structure of the DICJ 
 
 
The DICJ Group comprises the DICJ and three fully-owned subsidiaries, namely: 
 
 
(i)  the Resolution and Collection Corporation (RCC) [established as a 100 per cent 
subsidiary, limited company on 1 April 1999 as a result of the merger between the 
Housing  Loan  Administration  Corporation  (HLAC)  and  the  Resolution  and 
Collection Bank (RCB) in October 1998]. The purpose of the RCC is: 
  -  the recovery of loans transferred from the former jusen companies (see Hall, 
1999) (using its Jusen account); 
  -  the purchase and collection of NPLs from failed financial institutions (using its 
RCB account); 
  -  the purchase and collection of NPLs (classified as 'in danger of bankruptcy'' or 
worse)  from  sound  financial  institutions  (using  the  so-called  'Article  53' 
account, denoting the article of the Financial Revitalization Law authorising 
such activities); 80 
  -  subscribing to financial institutions' shares to enhance their capital adequacy; 
 
-  the pursuit of civil and criminal liabilities of former executives and debtors of 
failed financial institutions;  
  -  to act as a servicer under the license of the Minister of Justice; 
 
-  to act as an arranger for private corporate reconstruction funds and trust-related 
activities; and 
  -  to  purchase  and  collect  NPLs  from  the  agriculture  and  fishery  co-operative 
institutions entrusted by the Savings Insurance Corporation. 
In fiscal 2002, the RCC recovered  Y 924.3 billion of debts, disposed of 650 properties 
worth Y 31.7 billion in aggregate, executed real estate securitisations totalling around Y 40 
billion and sold other claims totalling Y 611.6 billion. This brought cumulative totals since 
1996, the date such operations began, to Y 228 billion for the value of properties sold, and 
to Y 873.3 billion for the principal value of other claims sold. 
 
(ii)  The Bridge Bank of Japan, Ltd. (BBJ). As noted above, the BBJ was established, 
under Article 92 of the Deposit Insurance Law, as a 100 per cent subsidiary of the 
DICJ, in March 2002. 
 
(iii)  The Industrial Revitalization Corporation of Japan (IRCJ). 
 
  The IRCJ was established, as a fully-owned subsidiary of the DICJ, on 16 April 
2003. Its capital has since been increased by further capital injections from the 
DICJ (raising its stake from Y 49.4 trillion to Y 49.8 trillion) and the Norinchukin 
Bank (Y 750 million). Its operations are supported by a  Y 10 trillion government 
guarantee. 
    The purpose of the IRCJ, which began operations in May 2003 and has a fixed 
life-span of five years, is to revitalise the business of ailing corporations in co-81 
operation with their main financing banks. It does this mainly by purchasing the 
claims on such corporations, which the IRCJ believes can be successfully turned 
around,  from  financial  institutions  other  than  their  main  financing  banks  at 
appropriate "market prices". Through such revitalisation activities, which protect 
the  flow  of  normal  commercial  credit,  the  IRCJ  hopes  not  only  to  stimulate 
economic activity but also to assist the banks in their disposal of bad debts. Any 
assets acquired by the IRCJ, which are of a higher quality than those acquired by 
the  RCC,  have  to  be  disposed  of  within  three  years,  the  main  buyers  being 
commercial banks, investment banks, private equity funds and business "sponsors" 
with an interest in seeing the company flourish as a going concern. Companies 
selected for assistance from the IRCJ have to meet productivity targets and restore 
financial soundness within three years of the decision to support them. Usually, 
current management is required to resign; and shareholders are likely to suffer a 
dilution of their interests. 
    The comparative advantages enjoyed by the IRCJ in the distressed debt work-
out market embrace the following: ability to act quickly as a neutral and fair third 
party in helping financial creditors to resolve disputes without resorting to the legal 
system  (the  ability  to  purchase  debts  facilitates  this  process  by  reducing  the 
number of creditors involved which, in the case of Kanebo, comprised over 100 
non-main banks); availability of specialist expertise (lawyers, accountants, work-
out business experts, etc.); advantageous tax treatment for the parties involved (e.g. 
booking losses on debt write-offs and asset reappraisal, offsetting debt forgiveness 
against  profits,  etc.);  availability  of  finely-priced  assistance  (e.g.  loans,  equity 
participation)  because  of  the  government  guarantee;  and  improved  debtor 
classification for assisted companies (close liaison with the FSA allows banks to 82 
remove  loans  to  IRCJ-assisted  companies  from  the  'need  attention'  category, 
thereby  reducing  loan  loss  provisioning  and  boosting  capital  adequacy  and 
profitability). 83 
TABLE A1 : FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY THE DICJ FOR 




Fiscal Year  Number of 
Cases 
Assistance Provided (Y  billion) 
    Grants  Asset Purchases  Other  Total 
           
1992  2  20.0  -  8.0  28.0 
1993  2  45.9  -  -  45.9 
1994  2  42.5  -  -  42.5 
1995  3  600.8  -  -  600.8 
1996  6  1,316.0  90.0  -  1,406.0 
1997  7  152.4  239.1  4.0  395.5 
1998  30  2,684.5  2,681.5  -  5,366.0 
1999  20  4,637.1  1,304.4  -  5,941.5 
2000  20  5,156.1  850.1  -  6,006.2 
2001  37  1,642.6  406.4  -  2,049.0 
2002  51  2,370.7  794.9  -  3,165.6 









TABLE A2 :  DEPOSIT-TAKING INSTITUTION FAILURE IN JAPAN 




Fiscal Year  Deposit-Taking Institution Failure 
  Banks  Shinkin Banks  Credit 
Corporations 
Total Number of 
Failed DTIs 
         
1991-1994  1  2  5  8 
1995  2  0  4  6 
1996  1  0  4  5 
1997  3  0  14  17 
1998  5  0  25  30 
1999  5  10  29  44 
2000  0  2  12  14 
2001  2  13  41  56 
2002  0  0  0  0 





Source:  DICJ, 2004, p.1. 
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TABLE A3 :  CAPITAL INJECTIONS BY THE DICJ MADE UNDER THE 
      "FINANCIAL FUNCTION STABILIZATION LAW" OF 1998 




Recipient Institution  Date of Capital 
Injection 
Nature of 
Assistance Provided  




 (Y  billion) 







         
Mizuho 
(formerly Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank) 
March 1998  99.0  --  99.0 
         
Mizuho 
(formerly Fuji Bank) 
"  --  100.0  100.0 
         
Mizuho 
(formerly Industrial Bank of Japan) 
"  --  100.0  100.0 
         
Mizuho 
(formerly Yasuda Trust and 
Banking) 
"  --  150.0  150.0 
         
SMFG 
(formerly Sakura Bank) 
"  --  100.0  100.0 
         
SMFG 
(formerly Sumitomo Bank) 
"  --  100.0  100.0 
         
MTFG 
(formerly Tokyo Mitsubishi Bank) 
"  --  100.0  100.0 
         
MTFG 
(formerly Mitsubishi Trust and 
Banking) 
"  --  50.0  50.0 
         
UFJ Holdings 
(formerly Sanwa Bank) 
"  --  100.0  100.0 
         
UFJ Holdings 
(formerly Tokai Bank) 
"  --  100.0  100.0 
         
UFJ Holdings 
(formerly Toyo Trust and Banking) 
"  --  50.0  50.0 
         
Resona Holdings 
(formerly Asahi Bank) 
"  --  100.0  100.0 
         
Resona Holdings 
(formerly Daiwa Bank) 
"  --  100.0  100.0 
         
Sumitomo Trust and Banking  "  --  100.0  100.0 
         
Mitsui Trust Holdings  "  --  100.0  100.0 86 
(formerly Mitsui Trust and 
Banking) 
         
Mitsui Trust Holdings 
(formerly Chuo Trust and Banking) 
"  32.0  28.0  60.0 
         
Bank of Yokohama  "  --  20.0  20.0 
         
Hokuriku Bank  "  --  20.0  20.0 
         
Ashigin Group 
(formerly Ashikaga Bank) 
"  --  30.0  30.0 
         
Shinsei Bank  "  130.0  46.6  176.6 
         





Source:  DICJ, 2004, p.26. 
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TABLE A4 : CAPITAL INJECTIONS BY THE DICJ MADE UNDER THE 




Recipient Institution  Date of Capital 
Injection 
Nature of 
Assistance Provided  




 (Y  billion) 







         
Mizuho 
(formerly Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank) 
March 1999  700.0  200.0  900.0 
         
Mizuho 
(formerly Fuji Bank) 
March 1999  800.0  200.0  1,000.0 
         
Mizuho 
(formerly Industrial Bank of Japan) 
March 1999  350.0  250.0  600.0 
         
SMFG 
(formerly Sakura Bank) 
March 1999  800.0  --  800.0 
         
SMFG 
(formerly Sumitomo Bank) 
March 1999  501.0  --  501.0 
         
UFJ Holdings 
(formerly Sanwa Bank) 
March 1999  600.0  100.0  700.0 
         
UFJ Holdings 
(formerly Tokai Bank) 
March 1999  600.0  --  600.0 
         
UFJ Holdings 
(formerly Toyo Trust and Banking) 
March 1999  200.0  --  200.0 
         
Resona Holdings 
(formerly Daiwa Bank) 
March 1999  408.0  --  408.0 
         
Resona Holdings 
(formerly Asahi Bank) 
March 1999  400.0  100.0  500.0 
         
MTFG 
(formerly Mitsubishi Trust and 
Banking) 
March 1999  200.0  100.0  300.0 
         
Sumitomo Trust and Banking  March 1999  100.0  100.0  200.0 
         
Mitsui Trust Holdings 
(formerly Mitsui Trust and 
Banking) 
March 1999  250.3  150.0  400.3 
         
Mitsui Trust Holdings 
(formerly Chuo Trust and Banking) 
March 1999  150.0  --  150.0 
         
Bank of Yokohama  March 1999  100.0  100.0  200.0 
         88 
Ashigin Group 









         
Hokuriku Bank  September 1999  75.0  --  75.0 
         
Bank of the Ryukyus  September 1999  40.0  --  40.0 
         
Momiji Holdings 
(formerly Hiroshima-Sogo Bank) 
September 1999  20.0  20.0  40.0 
         
Kumamoto Family Bank  February 2000  30.0  --  30.0 
         
Hokkaido Bank  March 2000  45.0  --  45.0 
         
Shinsei Bank  March 2000  240.0  --  240.0 
         
Chiba Kogyo Bank  September 2000  60.0  --  60.0 
         
Yachiyo Bank  September 2000  35.0  --  35.0 
         
Aozora Bank  October 2000  260.0  --  260.0 
         
Kansai Sawayaka Bank  March 2001  8.0  4.0  12.0 
         
Higashi-Nippon Bank  March 2001  20.0  --  20.0 
         
Resona Holdings 
(formerly Kinki Osaka Bank) 
April 2001  60.0  --  60.0 
         
Gifu Bank  April 2001  12.0  --  12.0 
         
Fukuoka Bank  January 2002  70.0  --  70.0 
         
Wakayama Bank  January 2002  12.0  --  12.0 
         
Kyushu Shinwa Holdings 
(formerly Kyushu Bank) 





Source:  DICJ, 2004, pp.24-25. 
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TABLE A5 :  DICJ ASSET PURCHASES (THROUGH THE RCC) FROM 
      SOUND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS UNDER ARTICLE 53 OF  
      THE "FINANCIAL REVITALIZATION LAW" OF 1998 FOR THE 




Institutions Assisted  Number of 
Institutions 
Principal of Claims 
(Y  billion) 
Purchase Price 
(Y  billion) 
       
City, Long-Term Credit 
and Trust Banks 
12  2,419.8  210.7 
       
Regional Banks  57  447.4  30.0 
       
Regional Banks II  38  396.9  9.8 
       
Co-operative-type DTIs  63  127.9  10.2 
       
Total  170  3,392.0  260.6 
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1  The Shinkin Central Bank, formerly known as the Zenshinren Bank, is the national federation of shinkin 
banks; the Rokinren Bank is the central national organisation for labor banks; and the Norinchukin Bank 
is the central cooperative bank for the agriculture, forestry and fisheries industries. [For further details of 
the  operations  of  these  and  other  specialist  cooperative-type  institutions  see  Japanese  Bankers' 
Association, 2001, Chapter 1.] 
2   Comprising  the  Bank  of  Tokyo-Mitsubishi,  Mizuho  Bank,  Mizuho  Corporate  Bank,  Resona  Bank, 
Saitama Resona Bank, UFJ Bank, and Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation. The number will fall to 
six when the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi merges with UFJ Bank during 2005. 
3   Comprising Mizuho Holdings, the Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group, the Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial 
Group, UFJ Holdings and Resona Holdings. The number will fall to four on completion of the merger of 
MTFG and UFJ Holdings during 2005. 
4  The bank, which was Japan's tenth largest regional lender, was nationalised following the bank's auditors' 
decision not to allow the bank to count any of its deferred tax assets (which amounted to 186 per cent of 
Tier 1 capital) as capital, causing its capital adequacy ratio to fall to –3.7 per cent at end-September 2003 
[the  minimum  required  of  "domestic"  operators  is  4  per  cent].  Liabilities  were  also  found  to  have 
exceeded assets by Y 102 billion. The nationalisation route, rather than allowing outright failure, was 
adopted because of concerns for the regional economy as the bank accounted for nearly 50 per cent of 
bank lending and deposits in its home prefecture of Tochigi. The action taken may also presage further 
nationalisation/rescue of similarly-placed regional banks in advance of the restoration of the deposit 
insurance cap of Y 10 million per deposit at end-March 2005 to all bar certain 'Payment and Settlement' 
deposits. [For further details see the text below.] 
5  For example, in April 2000 the Mitsui Trust and Chuo Trust merged to form the Chuo Mitsui Trust, 
which  went  on  to  merge  with  Sakura  Trust  in  February  2002  to  form  the  Mitsui  Trust  Holdings. 
Similarly, three trust banks – Mitsubishi Trust, Nippon Trust and Tokyo Trust – were merged to create 
the Mitsubishi Trust in October 2001.  
6   Data released in May 2004, however, suggested sustainable recovery may now be in place. Real GDP 
was shown to have grown at an annualised rate of 5.6% in the first quarter of 2004, taking its growth in 
fiscal 2003 to 3.2%. Nominal GDP growth of 3.2%, at an annualised rate, was also recorded for the first 
quarter of 2004, taking fiscal 2003 growth to 0.7%, the first positive annual growth rate recorded for 
three years. Equally reassuring was the revelation that the two-year expansion was fuelled not only by an 
expansion in exports but also by growth in domestic consumer demand, with household consumption 
growing, for the fifth consecutive month, in March 2004, taking annualised growth in the first quarter of 
2004 to 4.1%. Together with other figures showing a rise in corporate profitability, declining corporate 
bankruptcies and a fall in unemployment – a three-year low of 4.7% was recorded in March 2004 – 
commentators are finally suggesting the real economy may have "turned the corner" after a number of 
"false dawns" since the latter part of the 1990s. 
7   Although there has been a strong market recovery since the end of fiscal 2002, taking the Nikkei 225 
index back above the 10,000 level (compared with a peak of around 40,000 recorded in the late 1980s) 
and the Topix index back above the 1,000 level. 
8   There are some signs, however, that the worst may be over. Data released in December 2003 revealed 
that the Consumer Price Index rose by 0.1 per cent in the year to October 2003, ending five years of price 
deflation. 
9   Although this creates something of a "double-edged sword" for most banks, as it opens up traditional 
markets to competitors as well as providing new opportunities – the biggest "losers" were always going 
to be the Long-term Credit Banks given the undermining of their limited franchise (Hall, 1998b and 
1999b), a view endorsed by the subsequent nationalisation of the Long-Term Credit Bank (now called 
the Shinsei Bank) and the Nippon Credit Bank (now known as the Aozora Bank) in 1998 - the benefits 
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scope of permissible business activities. For example, under the Financial System Reform Act of 1992 
(which took effect in April 1993), banks are allowed to conduct securities business either through trust 
bank subsidiaries or, since February 2002, by themselves subject to permission from the Prime Minister. 
And, under the Financial System Reform Act of 1998, banks were allowed to conduct insurance business 
through wholly-owned subsidiaries from October 2000. Moreover, subsequent revisions to the Insurance 
Business Law have made it possible for banks to engage by themselves in retail sales of certain kinds of 
insurance products since April 2001, with the scope of permissible products being further expanded in 
October  2002.  Finally,  it  is  worth  noting  that  Japanese  banks  have  been  allowed  to  establish  bank 
holding companies, which may own securities and other finance subsidiaries, since March 1998; and 
since 1998, under the 'Big Bang' reform package, they have been allowed to sell investment trusts (i.e. 
mutual funds) over-the-counter. 
10   The Resona Holdings group was the exception but hardly surprisingly so given the government's rescue 
of Resona Bank in May 2003 through a capital injection of Y 1.96 trillion. This controversial rescue – the 
bank was found to be insolvent in October 2003 and many believe that the authorities knew it was 
insolvent at the time of the rescue – followed the FSA's declaration that the bank was undercapitalised 
(its auditors refused to recognise more than three years of Deferred Tax Assets as capital, resulting in the 
capital adequacy ratio falling to around 2 per cent, well below the 4 per cent minimum required of 
'domestic'  bank    operators  in  Japan)  but  solvent.  The  rescue  means  that  the  Deposit  Insurance 
Corporation, on behalf of the government, now owns over 50 per cent of the bank's ordinary shares and 
controls over 70 per cent of the bank's voting rights following an earlier acquisition of Y 1.2 trillion of 
(unconverted) preference shares under a DIC-assisted  merger between Daiwa Bank and Asaki Bank 
(which resulted in the creation of the Resona Bank) in March 2003. 
11   Using  the  Financial  Reconstruction  Law  definition  of  NPLs  (Hall,  2003b),  the  banking  sector's 
outstanding NPLs amounted to Y 35.3 trillion at end-March 2003, with the 'major banks' contributing 
Y 20.9 trillion to the total (Bank of Japan, 2003a). 
12   Although UFJ Holdings subsequently announced (in May 2004) that it would make a net loss of at least 
Y 300 billion in  fiscal 2003, largely due to  higher-than-expected loan loss reserves. This downward 
revision of its profits forecast, taken after heeding the advice of its external auditors, followed an earlier 
downwards  revision  announced  in  April  2004  to  take  account  of  the  higher  loan  loss  provisioning 
necessitated by an FSA inspection. This resulted in the bank lowering its net profits forecast for fiscal 
2003  from  the  figure  of  Y 135.1  billion  announced  in  September  2003  to  Y 125  billion.  The  latest 
revision means that the bank has breached the so-called "30 per cent" rule whereby the FSA, in respect of 
banks in receipt of capital injections from public funds, can take disciplinary action if actual net profits 
fall by 30 per cent or more in comparison with projections submitted to the FSA at the interim reporting 
date, for two consecutive years. The presidents of the holding company and the core bank are duly 
expected to resign. 
13   In the event, five of the top seven banking groups posted profits for fiscal 2003; the odd ones out were 
UFJ Holdings and Resona Holdings. Mitsubishi: Tokyo Financial Group posted the largest net profit, of 
Y 561 billion, followed by the Mizuho Financial Group (Y 407 billion) and SMFG (Y 330 billion). UFJ's 
net loss came in at Y 402 billion, compared with Resona's net loss of Y 1.66 trillion. This compares with 
the fiscal 2002 results which revealed that (Bank of Japan, 2003c): the banking sector made a net loss of 
Y 4.9 trillion (Y 4.6 trillion for the 14 major banks); operating profits from core business had fallen by 
Y 0.4 trillion, to Y 5.2 trillion, compared with the previous year (the major banks' figure decreased by 
Y 0.5 trillion to Y 3.4 trillion); net fee and commission income had increased by only Y 0.1 trillion, to 
Y 1.7 trillion, during the  year (the  major banks' figure  was unchanged at  Y 0.9 trillion); net interest 
income had fallen by Y 0.8 trillion, to Y 9.7 trillion, over the year (a fall of Y 0.7 trillion, to Y 5.2 trillion, 
was recorded by the major banks); general and administrative expenses had decreased by Y 0.3 trillion, 
to Y 6.8 trillion, over the year (a decrease of Y 0.2 trillion, to Y 3.5 trillion, was recorded by the major 
banks); the interest margin on lending had remained virtually flat (at about 150 basis points for the major 
banks) throughout the year, causing the "effective" margin (after deducting the realised credit cost ratio 
and the general and administrative expense ratio) to remain negative. 
14   This derives from syndicated lending (growth in which the BoJ has sought to promote by publishing 
relevant data on its website since December 2003), asset management and investment banking activities 
as well as the sale of retail investment products. 
15   Banks are required to reduce their holdings of stocks to less than or equal to Tier 1 capital. This has been 
helped by the Bank of Japan's share-buying activities (it has committed up to Y 3 trillion for this purpose 
– see below) and, prior to this, by the (less successful activities of the) Banks' Shareholding Acquisition 
Corporation (see endnote 36). 95 
                                                                                                                                                   
16   Fukao (2003) notes that, at end-March 2003, the banks held Y 1 trillion of surplus notes and Y 0.9 trillion 
of subordinated loans of life companies; the 10 major life companies in turn held Y 1.1 trillion of bank 
shares and Y 4.4 trillion of subordinated loans. 
    Moreover,  it  is  not  clear  that  all  the  bank  issues  of  preference  shares  and  other  interest-bearing 
securities which currently feature in Tier 1 capital should be allowed to; a portion, at least, should feature 
in Tier 2 capital, in line with BIS rules (see Hall, 1989, chapter 8). 
17   Despite  the  third  round  of  "special  inspections"  (see  below)  carried  out  by  the  FSA  (FSA,  2004b) 
demonstrating  a  narrowing  of  the  gap  between  the  major  banks'  approaches  and  those  deemed 
appropriate by the FSA – although UFJ's figure for bad loans posted at end-September 2003 had to be 
increased  by  another  Y 1  trillion  –  it  is  not  clear  that  the  regional  banks  have  yet  fallen  into  line. 
Moreover, recent events at Resona and UFJ call into question the FSA's assumption that the major banks' 
assessment of the quality of loans to large borrowers has become standardised. 
18   Fukao (2003) suggests such under-provisioning at end-March 2003 amounted to Y 5.4 trillion. 
19   This issue came to the fore again when the IRCJ revealed huge discrepancies between its valuation of 
Mitsui Mining's assets and the banks' own estimates of the value of their collateral backing loans to the 
company. 
20   Although, in respect of DTAs, the interim results posted at end-September 2003 indicated that the major 
banks had reduced their reliance on DTAs as a form of Tier 1 capital,  the ratio falling to an average of 
43 per cent from the 55 per cent figure recorded at end-March 2003. And further falls were reported for 
the full year of fiscal 2003 by a number of banks (e.g. MTFG, 15 per cent; Mizuho 33 per cent), although 
UFJ's and SMFG's ratios remained uncomfortably high at 63 per cent and 45 per cent respectively. 
21   As  of  end-May  2004,  14  companies  were  under  the  wing  of  the  IRCJ,  covering  the  industrial, 
construction and retail sectors. The biggest support operation concerned the household products firm 
Kanebo, which received Y 366 billion of financial assistance from the IRCJ. Of the Y 10 trillion funding 
available, just under Y 1 trillion had been spent; and, given the time constraints on its operations, new 
cases will have to be notified to the IRCJ by the end of 2004 if assistance is to be forthcoming. 
22   For earlier measures, involving the DIC's capital injections of 1998/9 and the RCB/HLAC, see Hall, 
2003a. 
23   Previously, the RCC was only permitted to purchase the banks' "bad" loans and, even then, only did so at 
a steep discount (96 per cent, on average) to book value, to ensure it avoided making a loss, thereby 
reducing  the  banks'  incentive  to  sell.  Subsidies,  therefore,  may  have  to  be  provided  to  encourage 
voluntary sales of doubtful loans. 
24   i.e.  those  whose  stock  prices,  external  ratings  or  other  indicators  had  been  experiencing  significant 
adverse charges. 
25   The original plan was to begin these in January 2002 but it appears that the earlier start was triggered by 
the failure of the retailer Mycal and subsequent revelations that the banks had only set aside minimum 
provisions to cover their liabilities as they did not regard such loans as being at high risk [i.e. they were 
classified as either Category I or Category II (rather than Category III) loans]. 
26   See BoJ (2003a) for further details. 
27   Following up on previous inspections, 161 borrowers were initially reviewed but this number increased 
to 169 after taking account of corporate separation, etc. .46 were subsequently excluded having gone 
bankrupt  or  been  removed  from  banks'  balance  sheets  or  otherwise  requiring  little  need  for  further 
follow-up inspections. This left 123, to which 10 new names were added. 
28   To soften the impact of the clean-up operation in the real economy, a raft of anti-deflation measures were 
introduced simultaneously. These entailed further easing on both the fiscal - tax cuts of at least  Y 1 
trillion would be made alongside some additional public spending – and monetary – the BoJ agreed to 
increase its monthly purchases of Japanese government bonds from Y 1 trillion to Y 1.2 trillion, and to 
increase its target for excess liquidity in the banking system by Y 5 trillion to a target range of "Y 15 
trillion to Y 20 trillion" (later raised, in stages, to "Y 30 trillion to Y 35 trillion") – fronts. New measures 
were also introduced to expand loans to SMEs on a "safe" basis, a process further promoted by the BoJ 
through its decision to purchase up to Y 3 trillion of securities linked to SME receivables. 
29   By, for example, promoting the development of asset securitisation, thereby freeing up capital to be used 
for the disposal of NPLs and, in its money market operations, recognising loans held by the IRCJ as 
eligible collateral, thereby helping to stimulate greater use of the IRCJ. 
30   As noted above, such an approach was enforced by the FSA via its special inspections regime. 
31   Other measures envisaged embraced rigorous examination of borrowers' reconstruction plans and the 
banks'  assessment  of  collateral,  more  special  inspections  by  the  FSA,  strengthening  administrative 
measures against inadequate  correction of self-assessment, and requiring bank  management to  make 
declarations regarding the accuracy of financial statements. 96 
                                                                                                                                                   
32   A  practical  guideline  on  the  issue,  however,  was  subsequently  issued  by  the  Japanese  Institute  of 
Certified Public Accountants in February 2003, 
33   To  soften  the  impact  of  this  increase  on  bank  capital  adequacy  and  profitability  the  FSA  was  also 
mandated to seek the tax deductibility of specific provisions set aside against possible future loan losses, 
the  norm  elsewhere  in  the  world.  The  idea  was  subsequently  rejected  by  the  tax  authorities  on  the 
grounds that it would be unfair to discriminate against non-financial concerns, which would not enjoy the 
concession;  moreover,  there  was  a  concern  that  such  a  move  would  simply  represent  a  device  for 
delivering a back-door infusion of state capital. Of equal importance, though not explicitly stated, no 
doubt was the anticipated loss of revenue that would result to the tax authorities at a time of deepening 
fiscal crisis. 
34   The "triggers" for conversion were duly revealed on 4 April 2003; they relate to breaches of minimum 
levels of capital adequacy and profitability, and the non-payment of dividends. Performance targets for 
recipients of the 1998/99 capital injections were also announced by the FSA in August 2003, thereby 
establishing a link between earnings, targets, management responsibility and bank restructuring. The 
FSA also threatened to issue banks with "business improvement orders" where necessary. At the same 
time, Mizuho, SMFG and seven regional banks were criticised for missing SME lending targets, initially 
set to prevent a credit crunch, stem the rise in unemployment and curtail corporate bankruptcies. The 
problem with this approach, however, is that it flies in the face of bank attempts to reduce risk-weighted 
assets and raise asset quality in the wake of capital adequacy constraints. 
35   Although the MJFG did aggressively use the RCC to dispose of around Y 660 billion of NPLs in fiscal 
2002. 
36   The main purpose was to stabilise the banking system's capital base by making it less vulnerable to stock 
market volatility.  And, to  minimise  the dampening effect caused by the banks' unwinding of cross-
shareholdings, a new government-run body, the Banks' Shareholding Acquisition Corporation (BSAC) 
was set up to buy, at "market" prices, those shares which banks voluntarily wished to dispose of in this 
way. Financed by the banks (those using its services would have to contribute 8 per cent of the value of 
shares sold to it) and borrowings from private sector institutions, the new body, which was established on 
30 January 2002, is able to purchase up to Y 2 trillion (if necessary, the figure can be raised) of shares 
over a five-year period. After 10 years, the Corporation is to be wound up, with any losses falling, in the 
first instance, on the member banks and, if they exceed member banks' contributions, subsequently on 
the government.  
37   The BoJ was also cognisant of the relative failure of the BSAC, not least because of the costs imposed on 
participating banks. 
38   Through, for example, the adoption of the new Bankruptcy Law, which replaced the 1922 law, passed in 
May 2004. 
39   The IMF is less concerned with co-operation in crisis situations, which it asserts works well, but rather 
with  pre-crisis  situations  where  more  formalisation  of  relationships,  involving  the  exchange  of 
information, should result in increased cost-effectiveness for the supervisory process (IMF, 2003, pp.31-
32). 
40   The FSA/BoJ argue in their response to the IMF that, despite the existence of statutory barriers (i.e. 
confidentiality obligations) to the full exchange of information, these do not prevent effective exchanges 
of necessary information between the two bodies. They therefore see no need for the formalisation of 
their working relationship (IMF, 2003, Appendix 1, p.66, para. 124). The FSA, however, acknowledge 
the need for more MoUs with overseas regulators, a process in which they are actively engaged (IMF, 
2003, p.48, para.55). 
41   The FSA argues in its reply to the IMF that current arrangements maximise the autonomy of the FSA 
within the confines of democratic control based on Japan's Constitution. Further independence from the 
Cabinet would require changing the Constitution, they imply (IMF, 2003, p.48, para.53). 
42   The bailout of Resona Bank – see below – the subject of much debate inside and outside the Diet, 
epitomises, for many, the politicisation of the FSA which resulted in the bank receiving an infusion of 
state capital under the "Financial Crisis Management" procedures even though it was subsequently found 
to be insolvent. The FSA's behind-the-scenes activities with both the government and the bank's auditors 
were all called into question. 
43   Tokio  Marine,  for  example,  resented  being  pressurised,  under  the  threat  of  disciplinary  action,  into 
merging with the Asahi Mutual Life. 
44   As noted earlier, it has to be worrying that the FSA refused to allow the IMF access to supervisory 
information when carrying out its stress tests. The inevitable conclusion that most will draw from this 
episode is that the FSA had something to hide namely, that Japan's financial system is even more fragile 
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45   The IMF has also called on the Japanese government to write off the DICJ's deficit (Y 3.4 trillion at end-
March 2003) in order to enhance the credibility of Japan's deposit insurance arrangements (IMF, 2003, 
pp.32-2, para.81). And Fukao (Fukao, 2003) is concerned about the problems which can arise from the 
application of the "type 2" and "type 3" measures set out in Article 102 of the Deposit Insurance Law, as 
amended in May 2000, which relate to the "Financial Crisis Management" scenarios (see Appendix 1). In 
particular, he notes the generous treatment of both employees and subordinated debt holders that results, 
compared with normal bankruptcy  procedures, thereby swelling the size of the publicly-funded bailout 
and further undermining market discipline. Moreover, like many others, he is concerned at the amount of 
discretion residing with the authorities with respect to the choice of which section of Article 102 is to be 
applied. The handling of the Resona Bank, which was deemed solvent at the time of rescue but found to 
be insolvent within a few months of being recapitalised using state funds, highlights the problems only 
too well. 
46   A critique of earlier developments is provided in Hall (1999c and 2003a). 
47   The first £20,000 of all deposits, on a per bank per customer basis, are now fully protected under the 
scheme introduced in 2001 (see Hall, 2002). 
48   The RCC has itself been criticised for the limited scale of its NPL purchases, the slowness with which it 
has sold repackaged debt on to the market (e.g. through auctions or securitisations) and its possible 
crowding out of the private sector. Certainly, in connection with the first criticism, purchases under the 
RCB account were limited. In large part, however, this was due to a general reluctance by banks to sell 
anything other than Yakuza-related NPLs (because, for example, of their relationships with borrowers, 
the low cost of carry of the loans under a near-zero interest rate policy and their limited ability to absorb 
losses given their weak capital positions) and, with respect to the RCC, a reluctance to accept the prices 
offered (typically, less than 10 per cent of book value). The situation has improved, however, since the 
RCC has been allowed to offer "fair" market prices and, in respect of Article 53 account purchases, to 
purchase NPLs at public auctions (possible since January 2002). By end-March 2004, Y 4.7 trillion had 
been spent purchasing assets with a face value of Y 21.8 trillion from 172 failed institutions; and, by the 
same date, Y 325 billion had been spent purchasing assets with a face value of Y 3.8 trillion from sound 
financial institutions. 
    With  regard  to  the  second  criticism,  the  slow  pace  of  disposal  of  purchased  debt,  it  should  be 
appreciated that, at least in relation to the Jusen account transactions, the nature of the debt acquired 
(long-term housing loans) meant that recovery would always be slow, recognised in the 15-year lifespan 
given to the account. Moreover, in respect of sales more generally, the RCC is keen to limit its losses, as 
reflected in its recovery ratios, measured as the ratio of the total value collected from sales to the total 
outlay: for business conducted until end-March 2004, these ratios were 61.4 per cent, 86.7 per cent and 
67.5 per cent (73.8 per cent overall average) for the Jusen account, the RCB account and the Article 53 
account respectively. 
    Finally,  with  respect  to  possible  crowding  out,  the  comparatively-low  prices  offered  by  the  RCC 
minimise the risk. Article 53 account purchases, for example, mainly comprise rural economy-related 
debts shunned by the market. 
49   Originally there were two auditors but Asahi & Co., auditors to Asaki Bank, were sacked when they 
refused to allow Resona Bank to show any DTAs on their financial statement for March 2003. 
50   Although Resona Bank, which resulted from the merger of Asahi and Daiwa Bank, in March 2003, is the 
fifth largest bank in Japan, it was forced to abandon overseas operations because of its inability to meet 
the 8 per cent capital adequacy threshold stipulated for all "internationally-active" banks by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision in the famous "capital accord" of 1988. 
51   The recapitalisation of the bank, which resulted in the government, through the DIC, owning over 50 per 
cent of the banks' ordinary shares and over 70 per cent of the voting rights because of the purchase of 
common stock and newly-issued preference shares (i.e. quasi-nationalisation resulted), later caused a 
political furore as an external audit undertaken in the Autumn revealed the bank's problem loans were 
much more serious than previously believed. This led Resona to report an interim loss of Y 1.76 trillion 
in October 2003 compared with an earlier forecast profit of Y 22 billion because of the identification of 
Y 1.2 trillion of additional NPLs and Y 400 billion of losses hidden at affiliated property companies. The 
audit strongly suggested that Resona was insolvent at the time of its rescue – May 2003 – meaning that 
the wrong section of the emergency legislation (i.e. para.1(1) of Article 102 of the Deposit Insurance 
Law of May 2000, which relates to the treatment of solvent institutions, instead of paras 1(2) or 1(3), 
which  relate  to  insolvent  institutions  and  involve  financial  administration  or  nationalisation  –  see 
Appendix 1) had been invoked and Resona had been wrongly rescued. The FSA strongly denied that it 
knew Resona was insolvent at the time of the request for assistance but it does beg the question: why 
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52   On this occasion, not only to avoid a wider systemic crisis but also to protect the local economy as the 
bank accounted for nearly 50 per cent of bank lending and deposits in its home prefecture of Tochigi. By 
the end of fiscal 2003, however, the bank's estimated net worth had fallen to minus Y 679 billion with 
bad debts increasing (from Y 544 billion at the time of nationalisation) to Y 735 billion and its NPL ratio 
deteriorating (from 13.93%) to 20.31%. 
53   The recommendation of the IMF (IMF, 2003, p.18, para.39) that DTAs be limited, as in the US, to 10 per 
cent of Tier 1 capital or one year's profits, whichever is the lower, seems a reasonable compromise. This 
would reduce the importance of auditors in the determination of capital adequacy although, as now 
(under guidance from the Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants) external auditors could still 
make their views known. Full exclusion of DTAs from regulatory capital – as is practised by Moody's, in 
respect of their calculation of a bank's stand-alone economic capital, because of the conditional nature of 
its recognition, its tendency to fluctuate over time (due to weakened capabilities in earnings generation or 
change in projected effective tax rates) and the absence of mobility for conversion into cash through 
immediate transfer or sale to third parties (see Moody's 2003) – would seem a trifle harsh, given its 
recognition as capital under 'generally accepted accounting principles' and its (albeit limited) recognition 
by US regulators. 
54   Fukao estimates that, between 1998 (when PCA began) and end-September 2002, the average degree of 
insolvency (measured by DIC assistance provided as a percentage of the total disclosed debt just before 
failure) for the 131 institutions which failed was 25.1 per cent (Fukao, 2003). And even  big banks 
showed relatively high degrees of insolvency: Holkaido Takushoku Bank, 18.8 per cent; Long-Term 
Credit Bank, 11.6 per cent; Nippon Credit Bank, 29.3 per cent. Clearly, PCA was not exercised promptly 
enough, suggesting the trigger points for action are too low and/or the remedial action taken (mandatory 
and otherwise) has not been tough enough. 
55   Currently, large exposures run by banks are limited to 25 per cent of capital per customer and to 40 per 
cent for a group of related customers. Exposures to shareholders are limited to 15 per cent of capital and 
to shareholders plus related parties, 25 per cent. These limits should be reduced to the Basel Committee's 
suggested levels. 
56   The top seven banks' combined NPLs declined during fiscal 2003 to Y 14 trillion from Y 20.8 trillion a 
year earlier. The top five banking groups reported the following NPL ratios at end-March 2004: UFJ, 8.5 
per cent; Resona Holdings, 6.7 per cent; SMBC, 5 per cent; Mizuho Holdings, 4.4 per cent; and MTFG, 
2.9 per cent. 
57   The bigger worry is UFJ Holdings which, despite agreeing to sell its personal trust business to Sumitomo 
Trust and Banking in May 2004 for Y 300 billion and its intention to sell its consumer finance subsidiary, 
Aplus, to help raise funds to assist in NPL disposal, will struggle to reach the magical 4 per cent figure 
by the end of fiscal 2004. And the disciplinary action taken against the management in the light of their 
abject failure to meet performance targets and their own internal forecasts for profitability, as well as 
their deliberate hiding of bad loan data from the FSA and their under-assessment of NPLs (40 per cent 
less than FSA estimates), is unlikely to help much in the short term. [In the event, MTFG came to the 
rescue  by  announcing,  in  July  2004,  that  it  would  merge  with  UFJ.  The  merger  will  start  with  the 
integration of their holding companies before March 2005, to be proceeded by the merger of their city 
bank  operations,  Bank  of  Tokyo-Mitsubishi  and  UFJ  Bank  respectively,  and  of  their  trust  bank 
operations, presently conducted by Mitsubishi Trust and Banking and UFJ Trust Bank respectively. The 
latter move means UFJ reneging on its deal to merge its retail trust business with Sumitomo Trust and 
Banking, a decision that has led Sumitomo to assess its legal options for securing compensation.] 
58   The  FSA  does  appear  –  although  the  latest  revelations  at  UFJ  concerning  its  40  per  cent  under-
assessment of NPLs and the discovery of Y 800 billion of additional NPLs at Resona Bank within three 
months of its rescue do provide some food for thought – to have forced the major banks to adopt more 
realistic assessments of asset quality and hence provisions, at least in respect of their exposures to large 
companies, through its regime of special inspections. This can be seen in the  narrowing of the gap 
between the aggregated self-assessments and those of the FSA. For example, following the first round of 
inspections, the major banks were found to have collectively under-recorded classified assets by 35.9 per 
cent and to have made insufficient write-offs and provisions by an amount equal to 47.1 per cent of the 
self-assessment  figure  (FSA,  2002c).  Under  the  second  round  of  special  inspections,  these 
underestimates had fallen to 10.1 per cent and 14.2 per cent respectively. And, according to the third and 
final round of special inspections, the under-recording had fallen further to 6.0 per cent and 8.7 per cent 
respectively. The attempt to standardise the major banks' approach to the assessment of asset quality in 
respect of loans to  large corporations had clearly  worked (at least beyond the confines of UFJ and 
Resona); and the enforced use of discounted cash flow techniques in the assessment/provisioning process 99 
                                                                                                                                                   
has led to more realistic appraisals being made of the likely future prospects of the banks' large corporate 
borrowers. 
59   A loss of Y 112.7 billion was recorded for the six-month period to end-September 2003. The losses arose 
from losses incurred on the sale and redemption of Japanese government securities, a fall in the value of 
its Japanese government bond portfolio and losses arising from its holdings of foreign (mainly US) 
government debt. 
60   And removal of the BoJ's rights of inspection, allowing it to focus exclusively on monetary policy issues, 
might hasten the demise of the BoJ's ambitions in this area. [The arguments for and against removing 
banking supervision from a central bank's remit, and the UK's approach to this issue, are addressed in 
Hall, 2001.] 
61   Such a development should not be used by the banks as an excuse for slowing the move towards the risk-
based pricing of loans, the enhanced screening and monitoring of credit risk, the restruction of their 
balance sheets and improved corporate governance (Oyama and Shiratori, 2001). 
 
 